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Abstract
Infrastructures like telecommunication systems, power transmission
grids and the Internet are complex networks that are vulnerable to
catastrophic failure. A common mechanism behind this kind of fail-
ure is avalanche-like breakdown of the network’s components. If a
component fails due to overload, its load will be redistributed, caus-
ing other components to overload and fail. This failure can propagate
throughout the entire network. From studies of catastrophic failures in
diﬀerent technological networks, the consensus is that the occurrence
of a catastrophe is due to the interaction between the connectivity
and the dynamical behaviour of the networks’ elements.
The research in this thesis focuses particularly on packet-oriented net-
works. In these networks the traﬃc (dynamics) and the topology
(connectivity) are coupled by the routing mechanisms. The interac-
tions between the network’s topology and its traﬃc are complex as
they depend on many parameters, e.g. Quality of Service, conges-
tion management (queuing), link bandwidth, link delay, and types of
traﬃc. It is not straightforward to predict whether a network will
fail catastrophically or not. Furthermore, even if considering a very
simpliﬁed version of packet networks, there are still fundamental ques-
tions about catastrophic behaviour that have not been studied, such
as: will a network become unstable and fail catastrophically as its size
increases; do catastrophic networks have speciﬁc connectivity proper-
ties?
One of the main diﬃculties when studying these questions is that,
in general, we do not know in advance if a network is going to fail
catastrophically. In this thesis we study how to build catastrophic
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networks. The motivation behind the research is that once we have
constructed networks that will fail catastrophically then we can study
its behaviour before the catastrophe occurs, for example the dynami-
cal behaviour of the nodes before an imminent catastrophe.
Our theoretical and algorithmic approach is based on the observation
that for many simple networks there is a topology-traﬃc invariant for
the onset of congestion. We have extended this approach to consider
cascading congestion. We have developed two methods to construct
catastrophes. The main results in this thesis are that there is a family
of catastrophic networks that have a scale invariant; hence at the
break point it is possible to predict the behaviour of large networks
by studying a much smaller network. The results also suggest that
if the traﬃc on a network increases exponentially, then there is a
maximum size that a network can have, after that the network will
always fail catastrophically.
To verify if catastrophic networks built using our algorithmic approach
can reﬂect real situations, we evaluated the performance of a small
catastrophic network. By building the scenario using open source
network simulation software OMNet++, we were able to simulate a
router network using the Open Shortest Path First routing protocol
and carrying User Datagram Protocol traﬃc. Our results show that
this kind of networks can collapse as a cascade of failures. Further-
more, recently the failure of Google Mail routers [1] conﬁrms this kind
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nodes it has (shown as thicker lines). (d) The path from source to
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2.2 (a) Betweenness centrality of the red node is the highest in the net-
work, the green nodes have medium betweenness, and blue nodes
have the lowest betweenness. (b) The star-shape network with
central node has the highest betweenness. (c) Fully connected net-
work with nodes has the same betweenness. (d) Red node act as
the bridge between two sub-networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 Four regular networks and a scale-free network. Nodes in the ring
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This chapter ﬁrst introduces the challenges we are facing in designing and man-
aging computer networks. It also states the aim, objectives and contributions of
this thesis. Finally, an outline of the thesis is given as a road map for the rest of
the content.
1.1 Challenge
1.1.1 The Studies on The Internet
The Internet is a worldwide network of interconnected networks with various de-
vices (routers, switches, servers, and PCs) using diﬀerent operating systems, that
transmits data using a wide range of protocols. It is simply a “network of net-
works” that consists of millions of domestic, academic, business, and government
networks, which together deliver various information and services. The explosive
growth of the Internet from the 1990s has led to the emergence of a computational
network that covers the globe, with a staggering number of users connected to it,
browsing the World Wide Web, transferring data ﬁles, making VoIP (Voice over
IP) calls and watching bandwidth–consuming videos. The intrinsic heterogeneity
of the Internet of various type of devices and connections, added to the unpre-
dictability of traﬃc on it, makes the Internet a very complex dynamic system.
The Internet has dynamic traﬃc and topology although the changes of traﬃc and
topology have very diﬀerent time scale.
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From the mid-1990s scientists and engineers try to understand what does the
Internet look like and what kind of properties it has. For example, how big it is,
how well connected it is? Engineers approach this problem from measurement–
mapping and visualizing the Internet. Some of them use BGP (Border Gateway
Protocol) routing tables, Route Servers or “traceroute” to gather information
for the Internet AS (autonomous system) level topology [5; 10; 11; 12]. Oth-
ers use “traceroute” [5; 13; 14; 15; 16] or “ping” to map Internet router-level
topology. But the measurement might not be very accurate for mapping the
router-level topology where some layer2 protocols, such as ATM (Asynchronous
Transfer Mode) and Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) [17] might hide parts
of the Internet topology. These layer 2 topologies are not visible to “ping” and
“traceroute”. But the data collected from the simple “ping” and “traceroute” is
very valuable for us to start understanding the IP-level of the Internet topology.
Physicists and mathematicians try to interpret the raw data from measurements
[18; 19]. Some also attempted to model the Internet topology [20; 21; 22; 23; 24].
In fact, not only the topology of the Internet, but also the traﬃc on it has long
been studied. The classic queueing theory [25; 26], which is the mathematical
study of queues. It enables mathematical analysis of several related processes,
including packets’ arrivals, waiting in the queue, and being served. There is also
a discovery of the self-similar properties of Ethernet traﬃc [27; 28].
But there is a lack of in-depth study of both the traﬃc dynamics and the
underlying network infrastructure, their impact on each other and the overall
network performance. Some pioneer researchers have begun the analysis of both
traﬃc and topology from network congestion, where the interaction between them
can be measured. Ohira and Sawatari [29] are the ﬁrst to study the simple model
of computer network traﬃc that can exhibit a phase transition from a low (free
ﬂow) to high congestion state. Then Fuks´ and Lawniczak [30], Sole´ and Valverde
[31; 32], and Woolf et.al [33], found that, in a regular network 1, it is possible to
predict the traﬃc load where congestion occurs (a dynamical characteristic) by
only considering the average of the shortest path lengths from all sources to all
destinations(a topology characteristic).
1Network with nodes having the same degree. Please check Chapter 2 for detail explanation.
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1.1.2 Network Congestion,Vulnerability and Failures
Network congestions (overloading) in some cases will lead to network failure. We
consider network failure as the situation that the network cannot provide normal
services to users and hard to recover. Man-made complex networks [20; 34; 35;
36] such as the Internet, power transmission grids and telephone systems are
susceptible to catastrophic failures in which the entire network ceases to function
[37; 38; 39]. The most common form of a catastrophic failure is an avalanche-like
cascade breakdown. This can result from the failure of a single node in a network
in which nodes are sensitive to overloading. Redistribution of the load carried
by this failed node over the network may cause other nodes to be overloaded
and fail as well. Consequently this would trigger an avalanche-like event in which
node failures propagate throughout the network. The entire network might in the
end fragment into disconnected sub-networks. It is claimed by some researchers
that networks with heterogeneous node degree distribution, such as scale-free
networks, are much more likely to suﬀer this type of event [40; 41; 42; 43; 44].
Because a small subset of core nodes are highly connected and handle much of
the traﬃc in this type of network. If one of these heavily loaded core nodes ceases
to function, either through malicious attack or random failure, it will have a large
impact on other nodes in the network, making subsequent failures very likely.
However, previous researchers do not explain if similar catastrophic failures
are possible in networks with more homogeneous degree distributions. Further-
more, they do not show and analyse the properties of the cascade networks, i.e.
degree distribution. Nor do they set up network simulations to test the topolo-
gies they modeled. Based on the importance of the robustness of the existing
network infrastructure and the rapidly increasing demand for resources in the
network usage, it is crucial to learn the pattern and properties networks that fail
catastrophically. After this, we could explore diﬀerent ways to prevent the catas-
trophic failure from happening. The starting point is to follow previous studies
on the Internet congestion and failures. Especially, the cascading failures that




Our goal is to analysis the properties of catastrophic failures on networks. To
achieve this aim we intend to:
1. Develop a new model to build network topologies that will fail catastrophi-
cally. The method will take into consideration not only the connectivity of
the network but also the traﬃc it carries.
2. Optimize the method developed in “objective 1”. Analyse the topological
properties of these generated catastrophic networks.
3. To ﬁnd out if there is any topology-traﬃc invariants for catastrophic net-
works. For example, can it be used to create and study larger size networks?
4. Verify the catastrophic network topology using network simulation. Carry
out simulations using diﬀerent size catastrophic networks to examine if the
networks built using the method in “objective 1”, do fail catastrophically.
Discover more properties related to network failures, especially catastrophic
failures.
1.2.1 Methodology Outline
Enlightened by previous researches in evolving complex networks and analysis of
complex network robustness, two novel methods are proposed to further investi-
gate the vulnerability of complex networks, especially the Internet. It is described
in the following steps:
∙ Investigate the network congestion and network failures, especially conges-
tion and failures on the Internet.
∙ Review existing network generation models including cascading network
generation studies.
∙ Propose the “random growth” network generation model to build networks




∙ Modify and improve the “random growth” model by introducing the “Branch
and Bound” growth model to have better control over the generation of
catastrophic networks.
∙ Find out the generated catastrophic networks’ properties (using both meth-
ods) and compare them with other networks.
∙ Build the network simulation scenarios to verify catastrophes on topolo-
gies generated using proposed method and collect various traﬃc data for
analysis.
1.2.2 Growth Model
A novel way of analysing network failures has been proposed by generating net-
work topologies that are designed to fail (catastrophic networks). The topology
generation follows the avalanche-like network failures in reverse, where it starts
from a small core network. We considered the node failure/overload in our re-
search using node betweenness centrality. It is also possible to consider link
failure/overload using edge betweenesss which is beyond our research. Nodes in
the network are sensitive to overloading that the load of nodes are estimated
using betweenness centrality. The biggest challenge is the searching of network
topology meeting the growing condition in the solution space for possible topol-
ogy. Because the solution space grows with N (size of the network) at 2푁 . The
challenge also lies in calculating betweenness centrality for each searched topol-
ogy to examine if they match the growing conditions. If not, the cascade failure
would not happen in the designed topology. The novel random growth method is
used to explore the solution space with random walks. Program is coded in C++
and successfully generated the network topology that will fail due to overload-
ing. Two more eﬃcient and novel searching methods are proposed by considering
the constraints on generating catastrophic network topology. The network in a
growth step is divided into three sub-networks to implement the new methods.





Invariants in node degree and node betweenness centrality are found in the catas-
trophic network topologies generated using the proposed methods. We ﬁnd that
there is a special family of catastrophic networks whose connections follow a
speciﬁc pattern relating to the degree distribution and betweenness centrality
properties. This observation hints that it is possible to construct very large
catastrophic network by only specifying the degree and betweenness centrality.
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis, which distinguish it from prior research
are:
1. Developed two novel growth methods to construct catastrophic networks,
including “random search” and “branch-and-bound” methods.
2. Found a new topological invariant related to catastrophic networks.
3. Veriﬁed that the catastrophic network topologies do fail according to the
design.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is organised in six additional chapters as follows. Chapter 2 intro-
duces diﬀerent background knowledge used in the thesis. They are graph theory
basics and related properties, betweenness centrality, complex network models
and the Internet. We also introduce the cascade and catastrophic failures on net-
works which is the main goal of the research. Chapter 3 served as a foreground
of the research by introducing network congestion and its metrics. It also reviews
previous work in predicting congestion in diﬀerent networks and examines the
invariants relate to the onset of congestion.
Chapter 4 takes a closer look at network congestion and the spread of it.
Then the causes of a cascading failure of networks and ﬁnally a catastrophic failure
of the whole network are studied in detail. A novel catastrophic network topology
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generation model using “random growth” method is proposed with analysis of
the generated networks. With the method introduced, one can build a small
size catastrophic network with similar nodes and links. Chapter 5 introduces
the optimized “branch and bound” method to grow catastrophic networks under
precise control of the network failure load and failure steps.
Chapter 6 focuses on the network simulation on the open source simula-
tion platform available to validate the catastrophic network topology. We try to
see if these networks do fail catastrophically as built under diﬀerent simulation
scenarios.
Finally, a conclusion is made in Chapter 7 about the research in this thesis





The study of network models can be conceptualized as lying at the intersection
between graph theory and statistical mechanics [36]. A ﬁrst step to understand
the complicated behaviour of networks lies in the accurate description of the net-
works’ topological properties. Section 2.1 is devoted to the basic notions and
properties of networks based on graph theory. It is followed by a brief overview
of the development of network models. These models are commonly used to try
to reproduce the topological and dynamical properties observed in real world net-
works. Examples of real world networks are presented together with the analysis
of their important topological properties. Special attention is paid to the Inter-
net, whose topological and dynamical properties will be further investigated in
following chapters. Previous studies of the robustness of networks are reviewed in
Section 2.3. And we focus on introducing network cascading failures and network
catastrophes. They have attracted more and more attention recently due to the
rapid development of man-made complex networks that we increasingly relied on,
i.e. the Internet, Electricity Power Grid.
The present chapter is not supposed to be an exhaustive review of all the recent
developments in graph theory, complex networks and the Internet. Detail and
in-depth review of complex networks can be found in the following books [45;
46; 47; 48] and articles [20; 34; 35; 36; 49]. Similarly, for an introduction to
graph theory the following books are recommended [50; 51; 52]. Last but not
least, an overview of computer network technology could be found in [53] while
Internet related protocols and standards could be obtained from IETF (Internet
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Engineering Task Force), IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers),
ITU (International Telecommunication Union) and other standard organizations.
2.1 Basic Graph Theory
The general concept of a network is a set of nodes (vertices) connected via a
number of links (edges). It can describe a wide range of systems either natural
or man-made. It is frequently used to study the biological networks (cellular and
neural network), food chains, human social relations, citations, power grids, wired
and wireless communication networks. In the mathematical terms, a network
can be represented as a graph 퐺 = (푉,퐸), where 푉 is the set of vertices (or
nodes) 푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푛 and 퐸 is the set of links (or edges) 푒1, 푒2, . . . that connect
two elements of 푉 .
Generally there are four kinds of graphs: directed weighted graphs, directed
unweighted graphs, undirected weighted graphs and undirected unweighted graphs.
In an undirected graph if two vertices 푖 and 푗 are adjacent, there would be an edge
between them represented by unordered pair (푖, 푗) or (푗, 푖), see Figure 2.1(a). On
the other hand, in directed graph the edges are only one-way, see Figure 2.1(b).
There are two kinds of edges in directed graph, the in–edges and the out–edges.
A graph can be fully characterized by its vertices and edges. Alternatively it is
usually described by its adjacency matrix 풜ˆ, where 풜ˆ푖푗 represent the connection
from node 푖 to node 푗. In general, 풜ˆ푖푗 ∕= 0 indicates the existence of an link,
while 풜ˆ푖푗 = 0 stands for the absence of an link. In weighted graph, every edge
has a weight, where the whole graph can be represented by weighted matrix. A
subgraph퐺′ = (푉 ′, 퐸 ′) of graph퐺 = (푉,퐸) is a graph having all of its vertices and
edges in 퐺, 푉 ′ ⊂ 푉,퐸 ′ ⊂ 퐸 [50]. Networks studied in this thesis are undirected
unweighted networks containing no loops or multiple links [50; 54], also known
as simple network (graph).
2.1.1 Degree and Degree Distribution
The simplest and the most intensively studied graph characteristic is the node’s
degree. The degree of a node is the number of links connected to that node (see
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2.1: Network representations: Graphs are usually represented as a set of
dots or circles, each corresponding to a node. Two of these circles being joined
by a line if the corresponding nodes are connected or adjacent to each other. (a)
Undirected network with nodes and links. (b) Directed links indicated by arrows
in a directed network. (c) Degree of the node in the center is the number of
links to other nodes it has (shown as thicker lines). (d) The path from source
to destination node in black and the shortest path for the pair in red. These
networks are drawn using Processing [2].
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Figure 2.1 (c)). The spread of the node degrees in the graph can be characterized
by the node degree distribution 푃 (푘) which is the probability that a node chosen
uniformly at random has 푘 connections. Numerically the degree distribution can
be exhibited by making a histogram of the degrees’ frequency. For a network





where 푛푘 is the number of nodes with degree 푘. The degree of a speciﬁc node is a
local property. However, the node degree distribution gives important information
about the global properties of the network, which can be used to characterise





2.1.2 Path & Shortest Path
Another essential concept in graph theory is the path. It is deﬁned as a sequence
of nodes where there is a link between a node and the next node in the sequence
[51]. The ﬁrst node is called the start node and the last node is called the end
node. The other nodes in the path are internal nodes. If a network is unweighted,
each link would have weight one. The path length is the number of hops counted
from the source node to the destination node.
The path with minimum length that goes from node 푠 to node 푑 is called
the shortest-path. The length of this path is ℓ푠,푑. Notice that the shortest-path
between a pair of nodes in a network is not necessarily unique. Single shortest-
path length of a pair of nodes is a local quantity, where the average length of
shortest-paths of the whole network ℓ¯ is a global network property. The ℓ¯ is also
known as the “linear size” of a network which is the average separation of any











where 푁 is the total number of nodes and 푉 is the set of nodes in the network.
There are also other properties of path related to diﬀerent networks:
∙ A cycle is a path such that the start and end node are the same.
∙ The path in a directed network is also a sequence of nodes with links being
directed from each node to the following one. Often the term directed path
is used in this case. The shortest path in directed network is the path with
minimum hop count from source 푠 to destination 푑.
∙ In a weighted network, every link has an associates weight. In this case,
the weight of a path is the sum of the weights of the traversed links. The
shortest path in a weighted network is the distance between source node 푠
and destination node 푑 with the smallest weight.
2.2 Betweenness Centrality
A large number of centrality indices have been introduced to measure the “impor-
tance” of nodes or links according to diﬀerent criteria. One of these “importance”
measures is the betweenness centrality [56]. Betweenness centrality is the frac-
tion of shortest paths that pass through a node in the network. Given a source
푠, and destination 푑, the number of diﬀerent shortest-paths between them is 푔푠,푑.
Consider the set of nodes 푊 visited by shortest paths from 푠 to 푑, the number of
shortest-path between 푠 and 푑 that contains one of these nodes 푤 ∈ 푊 is 푔푠,푑(푤).




















A node with high betweenness centrality in communication networks has a high
status, because it stands between other nodes on the paths of communications
and relays the information.
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It is worthy to remark that there are diﬀerent deﬁnitions of betweenness cen-
trality: a factor 1/2 can be included in order not to count twice the paths, mean-
while the paths containing the end nodes (i.e. 푠 and/or 푑) as initial or ending
points can be accepted or discarded (the two cases diﬀering just by a constant
contribution). While we focus on analyzing the packet networks, the betweenness
centrality used is slightly diﬀerent from the Freeman’s original deﬁnition [56]. In
his deﬁnition, the concerning node 푤 is not counted as either source or destina-
tion when summing values of 푝푠,푑(푤). Other authors do include 푤 as source or
destination [56; 57; 58]. For IP-level network, it is important to include single
hop routes where traﬃc from a source node to a directly connected neighbor al-
ways contributes to the load on the source. By considering this, the deﬁnition of


















where 푊 is the set that contains the nodes visited by the shortest paths between
푠 and 푑. Using this property and Equation (2.3), we could relate the betweenness














ℓ푠,푑 = ℓ¯푁(푁 − 1). (2.8)
2.2.1 Examples of Betweenness Centrality
A few examples of speciﬁc topologies are shown to further investigate the mean-
ing underlying the notion of betweenness centrality. Figure 2.2(a) shows a typical
network with nodes having diﬀerent betweenness centrality. A star-shape net-
work, Figure 2.2(b), has a unique central node 푛푓 and 푁 − 1 leaf nodes directly





Figure 2.2: (a) Betweenness centrality of the red node is the highest in the net-
work, the green nodes have medium betweenness, and blue nodes have the lowest
betweenness. (b) The star-shape network with central node has the highest be-
tweenness. (c) Fully connected network with nodes has the same betweenness.
(d) Red node act as the bridge between two sub-networks.
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because 푛푓 belongs to all shortest paths between pairs of leaf nodes, therefore,
from Equation (2.6)
퐶퐵(푛푓 ) = (푁 − 1)(푁 − 2) + (푁 − 1) = (푁 − 1)2. (2.9)
The opposite situation to a star-shape network is a complete graph in Fig-
ure 2.2(c). In this graph all nodes, according to the deﬁnition in Equation (2.6),
have betweenness centrality of 푁 − 1. Another interesting case is that a node
acts as a bridge joining two otherwise disconnected subnetworks shown in Fig-
ure 2.2(d). All paths between pairs of nodes belonging to diﬀerent subnetworks
have to pass through that particular bridge node. This bridge node turns out to
have very high betweenness even it may have very low degree.
2.2.2 The Calculation of Betweenness Centrality
The computational cost of determining the betweenness centrality for all nodes
in the network is very high, since one has to discover all existing shortest paths
between every pairs of nodes. Optimized algorithms introduced by Brandes and
Newman using diﬀerent deﬁnition can calculate betweenness centrality for all
nodes in time 푂(푁퐿) for a network with 푁 nodes and 퐿 links [57; 58]. For
sparse networks 1 the algorithm performs in 푂(푁2) steps. But this is still a high
demanding calculation when the size of the network is very large (i.e. 푂(10002)).
Or when the computation has to be repeated many times such as the topology
generation methods introduced in later chapters. Besides, a very diﬀerent deﬁni-
tion and calculation of betweenness centrality has been introduced by Newman
by counting how often a node is traversed by a random walk between two other
nodes in the network [59]. In this thesis, the Brandes’ algorithm is chosen because
it is easy to implement and relatively fast to calculate betweenness centrality.
1The kind of network in which the number of links is much less than the possible number
of links.
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2.3 Complex Network Topology
Graph theory has its origins in the eighteenth century by Leonhard Euler, whose
early work concentrated on small graphs with a high degree of regularity, for
example the famous Ko¨nigsberg Bridges problem. In the twentieth century graph
theory has become more statistical and algorithmic. The topology of a network
can be seen as the pattern of links connecting pairs of nodes in the network.
Networks with a complex topology and unknown organizing principles were often
believed to be random. Thus Solomonoﬀ and Rapoport [60] and independently
Erdo˝s and Re´nyi [61; 62] introduced a simple model of random graph where the
node degree distribution is based on random process which is known as “ER
model”. Later on, it was found out that many large networks do not exactly
follow the ER random network model. Their structures are more scale free, that
is, the degree distribution follows a power law distribution rather than Poisson.
Baraba´si and Albert introduced the concept of scale-free network which could
be used to model the large scale complex networks. Instead of constructing a
graph with exact topological features, the model place emphasis on capturing the
network dynamics in its growth by using preferential attachment [20].
2.3.1 Regular Network
If in network 퐺 all nodes have the same degree, then 퐺 is considered as regular
[63]. For example, a ring network is always a regular graph with every node
having two edges. Further, a lattice – a grid like network and a two branch
tree can also be seen as a regular graph (see Figure 2.3 for more examples of
regular network). Because of the symmetrical property of regular networks, the
degree for all nodes are the same 푘푤 = 퐾. So in a regular network the degree
distribution is a constant value. Further, by symmetry the betweenness centrality
is also constant for all the nodes 퐶퐵(푤) = 푐 [55].
2.3.2 Random Network
The simplest and most studied network with undirected edges is the ER (Erdo˝s
and Re´nyi) random network. This random network model has been used to
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Ring Manhattan torus Triangular torus Hexagonal torus scale-free
Figure 2.3: Four regular networks and a scale-free network. Nodes in the ring
network and manhattan toroidal network, in which the nodes on one edge of
the lattice connect to nodes on the opposite edge, have degree four. Nodes in
triangular toroidal network and heagonal toroidal network have degree six and
three.
study communication networks, in that communication networks tend to have
very complex topology and interactions. It is believed that they appear random
at very large scale. In this model: the total number of nodes, 푁 , is ﬁxed; and
the probability that two arbitrary nodes are connected is 푝 [60; 61; 62]. At
small values of 푝, the system consists of small clusters while at large 푁 and large
enough 푝, the giant connected component (big cluster) appears in the network.
On average, the network contains 푝푁(푁−1)/2 links. Because each edge is present
or absent with equal probability 푃 (푘). This makes the majority of nodes in
random network have approximately similar degree, which is close to the average
degree 푘. Hence the degree distribution of a random network is a binomial, or
Poisson distribution when the number of nodes in the network 푁 → ∞. The







so the average degree is 푘¯ = 푝(푁 − 1). For very large 푁 , the distribution takes
the Poisson form,
푃 (푘) = 푘¯푘푒−푘¯/푘!. (2.11)
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Therefore, the distribution rapidly decreases at large degrees. The shortest-path




Example of degree distribution of random network is shown in Figure 2.4(a).
2.3.3 Scale Free Network
2.3.3.1 Compare Random Network with Real Networks
Many natural and man-made communication networks can not be precisely de-
scribed by a regular network or a random network model. Let’s ﬁrst compare the
properties of random network model and real-world networks. A random network
is generated as follows:
∙ Start with a ﬁxed number 푁 of nodes and 푁 is not modiﬁed during the
network generation.
∙ Randomly connected or rewired pair of nodes in the network with certain
probability 푝. This is independent of the existing nodes’ degree.
The real-world networks are open systems:
∙ Starting from a small nucleus of nodes, the number of nodes increases
throughout the lifetime of the network by the subsequent addition of new
nodes
∙ Exhibit preferential attachment, such that the likelihood of connecting to
a node depends on the node’s degree.
A common feature of real world networks is that the network continuously ex-
pands by the addition of new nodes that are connected to the existing nodes
already in the system. And there are also examples of preferential connectivity,
such as a newly created web page will more likely include links to well known,
popular documents with already high connectivity, or new edge routers would
more likely to connect their uplinks to an existing aggregation router. These
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.4: (a) Degree distribution of three ER-Model Random Networks of 5000
nodes. Diﬀerent connection probability are used for diﬀerent networks: 푝1 =
0.15, 푝2 = 0.2 and 푝3 = 0.3. So that the mean degree values vary. (b) Degree
distribution of ﬁve BA-Model Scale-free Networks of 10000 nodes with 푃 (푘) =
푘−훾 and 훾 = 2.3 [3]. Note that both X and Y axes are in logscale.
40
2.3 Complex Network Topology
examples indicate that the probability with which a new node connects to the
existing nodes is not uniform, but there is a higher probability to be linked to a
node that already has a large number of connections.
2.3.3.2 Model of Scale-free Network
It is shown that many real world networks have degree distributions that deviates
from the Poisson distribution. In particular the Internet, World Wide Web, cellu-
lar networks, and ecological networks, their degree distributions have a power-law
tail [18; 20; 64]:
푃 (푘) ∼ 퐶푘−훾, (2.13)
where 훾 > 1 is the scale exponent and 퐶 is a constant. Even for those networks for
which 푃 (푘) has an exponential tail, the degree distribution signiﬁcantly deviates
from a Poisson distribution. The example of scale-free network degree distribution
is shown in Figure 2.4(b).
The model of the power-law degree distribution observed in networks was
addressed by Baraba´si and Albert [20]. They argued that the scale-free nature
of real networks is rooted in two generic mechanisms growth and preferential
attachment. Therefore these two ingredients, inspired the introduction of the
BA-model scale-free network.
1. Growth: Starting with a small number 푚0 of nodes, at every time step, one
adds a new node with 푚 < 푚0 edges that link the new node to 푚 diﬀerent
nodes already present in the system.
2. Preferential attachment: When choosing the nodes to which the new node
connects, one assumes that the probability 푝 that a new node will be con-
nected to node 푖 depends on the degree 푘푖. Such that, 푃 (푘푖) = 푘푖/
∑
푗 푘푗.
After 푡 time steps this procedure results in a network with 푁 = 푡+푚0 nodes and
푚푡 edges. Numerical simulations indicated that this network evolves into a scale
invariant state with the probability that a node has 푘 edges following a power
law with an exponent 훾퐵퐴 = 3 for Barabasi and Albert scale-free network [20].
The scaling exponent is independent of 푚, the only parameter in the model. In
practical terms a power law distribution means that the majority of the nodes
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will have very few neighbors, but there is a very small set of nodes with very large
number of neighbors. Networks with this property are known as scale-free because
power-law are free of a characteristic scale, that is, there is no characteristic
node degree. The average shortest path length of a scale-free network increases
approximately logarithmically with 푁 [20]
ℓ¯ = 퐴× 푙푛(푁 −퐵) + 퐶, (2.14)
where A,B and C are constants. Some other researches’ analytical results indi-
cate that there might be a double logarithmic correction to the logarithmic 푁
dependence [65; 66], i.e.,
ℓ¯ ∝ ln(푁)/ ln ln(푁). (2.15)
2.3.3.3 Compare Scale-free network with Random Network
An example of the scale-free network and random network is shown in Figure 2.5.
The scale-free network shown in Figure 2.5 (b) is a sample of artists network with
133 nodes of “myspace.com” [67; 68]. Its degree distribution in Figure 2.5 (d)
follows the power-law distribution. Figure 2.5 (a) shows the random network
of 133 nodes generated using the ER model. Its degree distribution is also illus-
trated below in Figure 2.5 (c), which reveals a diﬀerent distribution from scale-free
network. The random network is homogeneous, in which most nodes have ap-
proximately the same number of links. On the other hand, the scale-free network
is heterogeneous where the majority of the nodes have one or two links but a few
nodes have a large number of links. In Figure 2.5 (a) and (b), the red nodes are
highly connected with a high number of links; the green nodes are nodes with
medium number of connections.
2.4 The Internet
A good example of manmade complex network is the Internet. From the Oxford
Advanced Learner’s dictionary [69], the Internet is an international computer net-
work connecting other networks and computers from companies, universities, etc.





























Figure 2.5: (a) and (c) are topology and degree distribution of the 133-node ER
model random network (generated using Pajek [4]). (b) and (d) are topology and
degree distribution of 133-node scalefree network.
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not only conventional computers but also many other devices. It has become
a worldwide interconnected networks of hosts (PCs, laptops, netbooks, mobile
phones, sensors and many other terminals), servers (a computer that provides
certain network services), switches (connect network segments), routers (arrange
traﬃc across networks) and other network hardware. The Internet has also be-
come a critical infrastructure system. Because human beings rely heavily on it for
communication, banking, entertainment, and other infrastructure systems’ con-
trol. At the same time, the Internet also depends on other infrastructure systems,
such as the electrical power grid and water supply system for energy supply and
cooling. So it is crucial to understand the Internet’s topology and its behavior,
in order to avoid any severe malfunction which may have a huge impact on our
lives.
The Internet is designed to have a layer architecture, which is the most im-
portant and successful feature. There are two important reference models: Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model by International Standard Orga-
nization (ISO) [70] and TCP/IP Reference Model created in the 1970s by DARPA
of the United States Department of Defense, but now maintained by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) [71]. In the top layer (application layer) of the
Internet, one of the well studied topology is the World Wide Web (WWW), where
the nodes are web pages and the links are directed hyperlinks. One can also ﬁnd
Email network, peer-to-peer network, and many other networks in this layer.
2.4.1 Diﬀerent Levels of Internet Topology
In the Network layer (Internet layer), researchers are focusing on three diﬀer-
ent levels: AS-level(Autonomous System), IP-level and router-level. At AS-level,
each administration domain is composed of a set of routers and hosts and rep-
resented by a single node in the AS network. There are links between the ASs
if they are connected with each other. The AS-level topology is of interest to
those analyzing inter-domain networking, routing and QoS (Quality of Service).
Examples of AS-level Internet IPv4 and IPv6 topology measured by CAIDA are
shown in Figure 2.6 [5]. Although having the aggregation, the AS-level network
is still a very large network in scale. The IP-level network take the IP addresses
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as network nodes and the connections of these IPs are obtained from routing
table entries. And the Router-level network considers routers and end-systems
IP interfaces and their connections. The IP-level network and router-level net-
work are similar to each other, but they are not the same. In the router-level
network, a node often represents a single router and the links are the connections
between them. Note that this is an assumption for studying the IP-level network.
Studies at this level mainly focus on the impact of router and link failures, and
the optimization of network planning to avoid such failures. The IP-level and
router-level network of the Internet is much bigger and more complex than the
AS-level network (see Figure 2.7 [72]).
Figure 2.6: IPv4 and IPv6 AS-level topology produced by CAIDA 2009 [5].
The main diﬀerences in the AS and router level of the Internet from a techni-
cal point of view are the constraints associated with routing protocols. Routing
protocol is a set of messages, rules and algorithms used by routers for the overall
purpose of learning and calculating routes [73]. This process includes the ex-
change and analysis of routing information. Each router chooses the best route
to each subnet (path selection) and ﬁnally places those best routes in its IP
routing table. Routers are subject to administrative routing policies and make
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Figure 2.7: IP address Graph by LaNet-vi [6].
decisions according to the routing protocols used and information in the rout-
ing table. There are two diﬀerent classes of routing protocols: the intra-domain
routing protocols and the inter-domain routing protocols. The intra-domain pro-
tocols are used to pass information within the same AS, while the inter-domain
protocols serve for exchanging topological, path, and condition information be-
tween peer routers in diﬀerent AS. For example, the intra-domain protocols are
Routing Information Protocol (RIP) [74], Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing
Protocol (EIGRP) [75; 76], Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) [77; 78], Interme-
diate system to intermediate system IS-IS [75]; and the inter-domain protocols
are Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) [75], Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [79].
Faloutsos et.al [18] are the ﬁrst to study what does Internet look like. Many
other researches follow the trend of measuring and mapping the Internet topology.
In fact, the Internet is hard to map: with no central control organization, there
are economic incentives for ISPs to obscure network structure, making it almost
impossible to directly inspect. So one depends on measurement to ﬁnd out what
the Internet looks like with a mismatch between what one want to measure and
can measure. At the AS-level, it is very diﬃcult to obtain a consistent map
of the actual AS topology due to the dynamic nature of the Internet and the
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reluctance of AS Operators to reveal their ASs connections. However, one could
still map the AS topology by collecting BGP tables data from diﬀerent routers.
The IP-level and router-level networks are also changing all the time for multiple
reasons, such as network equipment failure, link failure and network maintenance.
Most of the ISPs are not willing to reveal their network detail either, which is
considered as commercial secret and high security information. The most widely
used method for IP and router level topology discovery is the “traceroute” [80],
although it is not very eﬃcient and accurate, because it might report a router with
several interfaces of diﬀerent IP addresses more than once, miss some routes, and
misinterpret the Layer2 structure and MPLS (Multiprotocol Label Switching)
network as a router. This is known as aliasing problem which can be partly
solved by aggregating a router’s IP interfaces under a single identiﬁer using “alias
resolution” [81]. It is also important to point out that for router-level topologies,
there are constraints on the current technology of how many links one router can
have [23]. In another word, there is an upper limit for the node degree in the
router-level network.
2.4.2 Shortest Path, Betweenness Centrality and Routing
In communication networks, some users would always want to send information
as fast as possible through the network provided with certain reliability. While
network service providers try to deliver the information as quickly as possible
through the shortest-path in the mean time, considering QoS, cost, etc. In IP
networks, the routing protocols are designed to choose the best available path
to send packets to their destinations. One of the functions of any routing pro-
tocols is to calculate the shortest path for the packets in the router based on
the information in the router’s routing table. The ﬁrst important algorithms for
calculating shortest paths is the Bellman-Ford single-source shortest-paths algo-
rithm [82; 83]. Some of the early Internet routing protocols, such as RIP [74], use
a distributed form of this algorithm. RIP uses hop count as the metric for routes,
in which all links have the same weight (unweighted) for shortest path calcula-
tion. Another well known algorithm is the Dijkstra’s single-source shortest-paths
algorithm. It ﬁnds all the shortest paths from the source node to every other
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node in the network. It is used by the OSPF routing protocol [77]. So that each
router running OSPF would calculate its own shortest paths to all routers in the
same network. The implementation of these two shortest-path algorithm could
be found in Boost Graph Library [84] and programming algorithm books [85; 86].
But the journey time for a packet to go through two shortest-paths with the
same length can be very diﬀerent, due to diﬀerent traﬃc patterns and rate of
usage of the routes (paths). Therefore, in the network, there are nodes that
are highly utilized to transfer packets, while the others spend most of the time
idle or transferring small amount of packets. The betweenness centrality can be
used to measure the importance of nodes in diﬀerent traﬃc situations and ﬁnd
out possible loads of the nodes. The nodes with high betweenness centrality
are relatively more important in the network as they are visited by more routes
(shortest paths). The queues in these nodes can be built up more easily and
quickly. It is expected that the removal of these nodes will worsen the network
performance to a certain level for diﬀerent kinds of network topologies. In the
worst situation failure of a node with high betweenness centrality could cause
severe congestion. In some cases the congestion could spread out through the
network and trigger a cascade breakdown of nodes in the network.
2.5 Cascade Failures and Catastrophes
Examples of very large-scale complex network can be easily found in everyday
life. In the human body, the brain is a network of nerve cells connected by axons
(nerve ﬁbers), and the cells themselves are networks of molecules connected by
biochemical reactions. In telecommunication, the Internet is a network of hosts,
switches, and routers linked by various communication lines (telephone line, twist-
pair line, optical ﬁbre) with diﬀerent bandwidths. Despite of the importance of
these networks, scientists have had limited understanding of their structure, prop-
erties and interactions. Humanity becomes increasingly dependent on ubiquitous
communication networks, electricity provided by power grids, and other critical
infrastructure networks. A much-voiced concern arises: exactly how reliable are
these networks, especially the Internet that everybody now rely on so much? Why
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does diﬀusion of information occur so rapidly in certain social and communica-
tions systems, leading to epidemics of diseases and computer viruses? Why do
the Power Grids sometimes breakdown so quickly and the failure spread through
a very large area? Is there a pattern for this kind of breakdown? All these ques-
tions lead to the research and analysis of the robustness of networks’ structures
and their resilience to failures and attacks.
Some researchers argue that scale-free complex systems can be amazingly
resilient against accidental failures [40; 87], due to the existence of ‘hub’ like
nodes: small number of nodes with very high connectivity. Further, random
failures or attacks are more likely to be on one of the low-degree nodes, that
the removal of one of these nodes has minimal impact on the network’s overall
connectivity or functionality. But there are still some unexpected failures on
critical networks. For example in 2007, the online telephone service Skype was not
working for two days from 16th August, leaving its 220 million users disconnected,
some of them were small businesses that had given up their land lines, without
a way to call colleagues, customers and friends [88]. A ﬂaw in a crucial piece of
software that connects users to central servers appears to have been the source
of the problem, where overloaded servers were brought down one by one. The
denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the Internet root name servers in 2002 and
2007 could easily bring down the Internet rather than several web sites. In 2003,
the Northeast Electricity Blackout was a massive widespread power outage that
occurred throughout parts of the Northeastern and Midwestern United States
and Ontario, Canada. The blackout aﬀected an estimated 10 million people in
the Canadian province of Ontario and 45 million people in eight U.S. states. But
some of the most serious, even potentially devastating, problems with networks
arise from sources with no intentional attack from Hackers. It is simply, complex
system breaks down in a complex way. As a result, the focus of this thesis is trying
to answer some of these very complex questions. The starting point is analyzing
the communication networks which are the man-made networks designed typically
for distribution of information. But the theory could also be extended to other
complex systems.
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2.5.1 Vulnerability of Complex Network
Previous researches show that network components (nodes, links) can fail due
to several events. For example, an accident happened in the network, internal
failure of a node or link, or an intentional attack to network components. The
attack is most destructive in a complex network according to Albert et.al [87] who
claim that scale-free networks possess the “robust-yet-fragile” property. They are
robust against random failures of nodes but fragile to intentional attacks on the
highly connected nodes. However, the term fragility here means that a scale-free
network can become disconnected under attacks on a small but still appreciable
set of nodes that include a substantial fraction of links in the network [89; 90]. An
attack on a single or a very few random selected nodes will, in general, not bring
down the network. This interesting result was actually obtained based purely on
the scale-free structure of the network. In other words, it is considering only the
topological structure, but the network dynamics has not been taken into account
[43].
It is assumed that after an attack, a node will lose the ability to function.
This type of node failure would not be necessarily the same for diﬀerent types
of real-world networks. To maximize the destructive eﬀect, one can target the
important nodes or links. In this case, the two mainly used metrics to measure the
importance of a node (or edge) in the network are node degree and betweenness
centrality. That is the degree characterises the number of neighboring nodes and
betweenness measures the number of shortest paths pass through the node.
2.5.2 Cascading Failures
In some circumstances, in a complex network, small-scale local activities of indi-
vidual nodes may cause the eﬀect to propagate to other parts of the network, and
sometimes a global (system wide) event occurs. These avalanche-like failures are
known as cascading failures. Researchers are focusing on the dynamic response of
the network to the initiating disturbance and examining the subsequent cascading
failures that are induced when nodes’ operating thresholds are exceeded [37; 39].
Imagine a network that transports some physical quantities or load. Nodes with
large numbers of links receive a relatively heavier load. Each node, however, has
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a ﬁnite capacity to process or transport load. In order for a node to function
properly, its load must be less than the capacity it could handle at all times; oth-
erwise it would not meet the demand and causes failures. In these cases, its load
will be redirected to other nodes, causing a redistribution of load in the network.
If the failing node deals with a small amount of load, there will be little eﬀect on
the network because the amount of load that needs to be redistributed is small.
However, if the failing node carries a large amount of load, the consequence could
be serious because this amount of load needs to be redistributed and it is possible
that for some nodes, the new load exceeds their capacities. These nodes will then
fail, causing further redistributions of load, and so on. As a consequence, a large
fraction of the network can break down.
There are a few recent studies on cascading failures in complex networks
[42; 43; 44; 91; 92; 93]. In Motter and Lai’s work [42], a simple mechanism
has been proposed to incorporate the dynamics of the network in both random
and scale-free networks. The model generates results that are completely consis-
tent with the above intuition on cascading failures. Zhao et.al [43; 44] further
improve the work on modeling the cascading breakdown. They understand the
cascading failures in complex networks in terms of a phase transition process.
In free ﬂow stage the network functions properly, while in the congestion stage
the demands exceed the network’s capacity in some parts and cause a chain re-
action sometimes leading to a global cascade. Holme et.al [40; 41; 94] analyse
the vulnerability of complex networks in node and edge overload breakdown by
evolving the networks. It simply generates the complex network while examining
the networks’ functionality at each generation step. Measurement of the network
operation condition can be done by calculating the average shortest path length
(or inverse of average shortest path length) and the size of the largest connected
subgraph after an attack.
2.5.3 Cascade to Catastrophe
Cascading failure can occur in many real world physical systems and sometimes
leads to a catastrophe. In a power transmission grid, for instance, each node
(a generator) deals with a load of power. Removal of nodes, in general, can
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cause redistribution of loads over all the network, which can trigger a cascade
of overloading failures. As an example, the recent massive power blackout was
caused by a series of seemingly unrelated events on 5th Nov 2006 [95]. A German
electric company had a high-voltage transmission line shut down over a river to
let a ship to pass. This have caused a chain-reaction power outages that left about
10 million people in the dark across Europe. A similar incident occurred in the
United States in 2003, when tree limbs touching a power line in Ohio triggered a
blackout that cascaded across the eastern part of the country and into Canada,
aﬀecting 50 million people [95].
The example of the power grid shows that end-user nodes pull electric load
from the power sources. But the situation is diﬀerent for the Internet. On one
hand, server nodes would push data to the end-user nodes according to the users’
requests through the network. On the other hand, end-user might share data
using peer-to-peer technology where they would pull and push data from the
network. Despite the diﬀerences, similar failure examples can be found in the
Internet, where the load represents data packets and a node (router) is requested
to transmit and overloading corresponds to congestion. The redistribution of
data packets from a congested router to another may spread the congestion to
a large fraction of the network. From the “Network World” news in April 1998,
the AT&T frame relay network suﬀered a catastrophic failure [96]. All of the
company’s 145 switches were brought down, leaving thousands of frame relay
customers oﬀ-line for more than 24 hours. For the Internet, there is also a kind
of cascade failure found in the early years called congestion collapse [97]. It is
an overload condition that the network has reached the state that traﬃc demand
is higher than throughput available, and there are high levels of packet delay
and loss. Nevertheless, it was solved by the introduction of improved congestion
control mechanisms [98; 99].
However with the increasing dependence on the Internet, we could face severe
congestion. Firstly, there is a sharp increase in UDP (User Datagram Protocol)
traﬃc on the Internet. UDP is deﬁned to make available a datagram mode of
packet-switched computer communication networks using the Internet Protocol
(IP) as the underlying protocol. It provides a procedure for application programs
to send messages to other programs with a minimum of protocol mechanism.
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Further it is transaction oriented, therefore delivery and duplicate protection are
not guaranteed. Thus, UDP provides an unreliable service and datagrams may
arrive out of order, appear duplicated, or lost. Time-sensitive applications often
use UDP rather than TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) [100] because drop-
ping packets is preferable to using delayed packets. Network protocols that use
UDP are Video streaming protocols (i.e., Real-time Transport Protocol, RTP)
[101], Voice over IP (VoIP) (i.e. Session Initiation Protocol, SIP) [102], the Do-
main Name System (DNS), and Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP). Moreover,
there is an increasing amount of consumers that prefer to watch TV programs
(i.e., BBC iPlayer), movies through the Internet and making International phone
calls using VoIP applications (Skype). It has injected a lot more traﬃc into the
Internet than expected and might cause congestion due to the increasing demand.
But at the same time, Internet Service Providers (ISP) are keen to cut cost, save
energy, increase the eﬃciency by pushing the existing infrastructure to its oper-
ation limit. In this case, the rapid growth in user number and user demands for
network resources can not be met by the slow network system upgrade provided
by ISPs. All these would cause congestion, and aﬀect the whole user experience
with very poor QoS. One example is the United States AT&T Mobile Network
that provides 3G (Third Generation mobile service) and WiFi (WLAN) for all the
Apple iPhone users with unlimited Internet usage. Users are getting full use of
the advantage of IPhone and its applications for video streaming and VoIP calls,
although AT&T terms of service prohibited certain kind of streaming. While
AT&T is not prepared for the excessive amount of traﬃc, users ﬁnd it very dif-
ﬁcult to make phone calls and slow to surf the Internet. Other threats for the
Internet are from the Botnets, which is a collection of software robots that run
autonomously and automatically. It is a network of computers that have been
infected with malicious software and controlled by hackers. The Botnets are very
popular and used to initiate attacks in the Internet [103]. For example:
∙ Denial-of-service attacks (DoS) [104], where multiple systems autonomously
access a single Internet system or service in a way that appears legitimate,
but much more frequently than normal use and cause the system to become
unavailable for normal users. The most devastating attack is DoS on Central
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DNS servers, which could keep the DNS servers out of normal service and
lots of computers could not explain the domain names.
∙ E-mail spam, where e-mail messages disguised as messages from people, but
are either advertising, annoying, or malicious in nature.
∙ Adware exists to advertise some commercial entity actively and without the
user’s permission or awareness.
∙ Spyware is the software which sends information to its creators about a
user’s activities.
Above all, cascade or catastrophic failures do exist in real-world complex
networks. These failures might be triggered by diﬀerent events in the network
system. But most of them propagate through networks in the form of overloading
and load redistribution. Under overload conditions, the network components
might fail to function properly or stop accepting extra load. Then the load will
be redistributed to other components.
2.6 Summary
Complex networks are modeled as graphs with the vertices representing nodes
and edges for links between the nodes. As a starting point, several important
structural properties of networks (graphs) are reviewed with their deﬁnitions, no-
tations and how they could be used to observe networks. They are node degree,
degree distribution, path, shortest path, and most importantly the betweenness
centrality. The network degree distribution can help us to identify which type
the observing network is, either regular, random, or scale-free complex network.
These three kinds of models are all used to study real world networks, where
regular networks have the same degree for every node, random networks degree
distributions follow Poisson distribution, and scale-free networks degree distribu-
tions follow the power law distribution.
Shortest path algorithms are used by most of the Internet routing protocols to
calculate paths for routers based on the information obtained from routing table.
Using betweenness centrality, which could give out the number of shortest paths
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passing through a node, one could estimate the usage of a speciﬁc node in the
computer network. The higher the betweenness centrality, the busier the node
would be handling packets. When the load of a node in the network exceed its
capacity of handling packets, this node might reject incoming packets and notice
its neighbors using routing protocols it is too busy to accept packets. Then
routing protocols would redirect packets to other router and avoid the congested
node. In some cases, if the congested node has a high betweenness centrality
that many packets would go through it, the redirected traﬃc may cause other
nodes to fail. Because the volume of redirected traﬃc is too big for others to cope
with. In the worst case, a cascade failure of network node might occur when the
redirection of traﬃc cause load on a sequence of nodes exceed their limits.
In the following chapter, we are going to investigate congestion in the network




Between Topology and Traﬃc
3.1 Introduction
In an ideal world, information in the communication network should ﬂow freely
allowing people to communicate anytime anywhere. But in reality, network con-
gestion happens from time to time due to diﬀerent reasons. To ensure free ﬂow of
information on a network is of great interest to communication network engineers.
And to achieve free ﬂow of network traﬃc, they consider using control methods,
such as routing protocols or congestion control mechanisms.
On the other hand, researchers interested in complex network theory mainly
focus on the topological (static) properties of the concerning network, i.e. degree
distribution, average shortest path length. From the late 1990’s, researchers
began to consider both topological and dynamical properties of communication
networks where the binding elements between them are the routing and congestion
control mechanisms [55].
The interest of this thesis is in the onset of congestion in a network and
its propagation pattern throughout the network. The way discussed to study
congestion is based on the information transmission and exchange of the Internet.
In this chapter, we ﬁrst introduce the concept of network congestion and its
metrics. It is followed by the review of previous work in predicting congestion in
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regular networks and general networks. Finally, we examine the invariants that
relate to the congestion in networks.
3.2 Network Congestion
To the author’s knowledge, there are many deﬁnitions of congestion. As from
[105], the network is congested if the service quality noticed by the user decreases
because of the increase of network load. From network engineers’ point of view,
network congestion occurs when demand of network resource exceed the network
capacity.
Congestion can occur in the network due to diﬀerent factors [53; 105]. For
example, if excessive packets arrive at the same router, a queue will build up
in it. And it will only drop packets if it is full. When packet loss occurs, the
packet delivery is delayed for the whole network and the packets throughput will
decrease. The underlying assumption about the queue design is that a subsequent
traﬃc reduction would eventually allow the queue to empty, thus making it a
buﬀer device to compensate for short traﬃc bursts. But storing packets in a
queue can add signiﬁcant delay to the packet transmission.
Furthermore, traﬃc in the network could follow the Poisson distribution or
could be statistically self-similar [27]. The self-similar traﬃc is characterised by
its large ﬂuctuation which is also know as the “burstiness” property. Bursty traﬃc
could easily ﬁll up router queues in the network. Even deploying routers with
inﬁnite queue the congestion might get worse in some cases. By the time packets
get to the front of the queue, they have already timed out and duplicates have
been sent from the source. All these packets will be dutifully forwarded to the
next hop router, further increasing the load on the network all the way from the
source to destination. If a router has a slow processing ability, it can also cause
congestion. If the router is slow at performing its tasks (routing calculation,





There are several metrics that can be used to capture the congestion phase of a
network. Classic metrics are End-to-End delay of packets, network throughput
and packet loss rate [105; 106; 107]. When the network is congested, delay is
caused by the overload of data packets. In this case, the data packets arriving at
congested points (i.e. routers) will be queued. The waiting in the queue increases
the delay and the number of packets that can reach their destination decreases.
In the worst case, all packets arriving at the congestion nodes will be dropped
when the network reaches its capacity. Other parameters to measure congestion
are the average queue lengths at each node of the network, the total number of
packets in the network and the standard deviation of packet delay.
Our measure of congestion focuses on the End-to-End delay of packets. The
End-to-End delay of a packet can be attributed to many factors. It is important to
be aware of such factors to better understand the reason of delay and congestion.
There are several kinds of delays in the packet networks:
∙ Processing delay - the time routers take to process packets. A router takes
a packet from an input interface, examines it and puts it into the queue of
the output interface. It depends on the router’s CPU speed and utilization,
its architecture and conﬁguration.
∙ Queuing delay - the time a packet resides in the queues of a router. It
depends on the number and size of packets already in the queue, the speed
of the interface and the type of queueing mechanism applied.
∙ Transmission (Serialization) delay - the time it takes to push the packet’s
bits onto the link.
∙ Propagation delay - the time it requires to transmit a packet from the source
to the destination, which depends on the type of media used.
A typical client and server network setup is shown in Figure 3.1. The process
delay would come from the process of packets on the user host, the server, two
switches and three routers. But queueing delay normally happens on the three
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Figure 3.1: Network Delay
routers. Furthermore, the transmission and propagation delay depends on the
connection type between all the devices in the network.
So the the delay time of a packet 휏푠,푑 elapses from the creation at its source
푠 to its arrival at the destination 푑. In a network, the average delay of all the







where 푁 is the number of nodes in the network. It is an important quantity
to assess the performance of a network. To a ﬁrst approximation, the average
delay is proportional to the average number of nodes that the packets visit when
traveling. If the traﬃc load 휆 (the packet creation rate at each node) presented
to the network is low, then the queues on the nodes are empty. As the traﬃc
load increases, the queues at the nodes start to build up, the average delay time
increases accordingly. If the traﬃc load increases even further, then at the crit-
ical load 휆∗, the queues of some nodes grow quickly and the average delay time
increases dramatically or even diverge. At this critical load, it is considered that
the network is congested.
This critical behavior is also noticed in the network throughput. The through-
put is deﬁned as the number of packets reaching their destination per simulation
unit time per host [33]. Starting from a low load, the throughput increases propor-
tionally to the increase of the load, until congestion is reached. At the congestion
point the network has its maximum throughput. If the number of packets at node
푖 at time 푡 is denoted by 푠푖(푡), then the total number of packets in the network
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where 푄푖 is the queue length of node 푖. If the network is not congested, and the







is also ﬁnite. At the congestion point, the queues of the congested nodes increase
rapidly and this implies that the total number of packets in the network continues
to increase.
3.3 Topology and Traﬃc
Ohira and Sawatari [29] were the ﬁrst to study a simple model of computer
network traﬃc which exhibits a phase transition from a low (free ﬂow) to high
(congestion) state. It was measured in terms of packet average travel time 휏
(End-to-End delay) as a function of the packet creation rate 휆 in the network,
휏 = 푓(휆). Through simulations on a two-dimensional lattice model network, they
found that the transition to congestion phase depended on how each router chose a
path for the packets in its queue (Routing Strategy). Later, Fuks´ and Lawniczak
[30], Sole´ and Valverde [31; 32], and Woolf et.al [33], found that, in a regular
network, it was possible to predict the traﬃc load where congestion occured (a
dynamical characteristic) by only considering the average shortest path lengths
from all sources to all destinations (a topological characteristic). Their result can





Where 휆∗ is the critical load that the network goes into congestion phase, 휌 is
the percentage of nodes that are hosts (a source and sink of traﬃc), 1− 휌 is the
percentage of routers and ℓ¯ is the average path length. Their prediction does
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not depend on a speciﬁc network topology and has been tested in rectangular
network, random network and small-world ring-shape networks.
3.3.1 Critical Point of Congestion
There is a simple way to estimate the critical load when the network changes
from free-ﬂow stage to congestion. It is to look for the total distance that all
the packets at time 푡 have to travel to reach their destinations. In the congested
phase if there are queues at all the nodes, then the change in total distance is
퐷(푆푡+1) −퐷(푆푡), where 푆(푡) is the number of packets in the network at time 푡,
and 퐷(푆푡) is the aggregated distance of all packets from their destinations at time
푡. The increase in the number of packets per simulation unit time is 휌휆푁 . The
overall added distance by the generation of new packets is 휌휆푁ℓ¯. By contrast, the
aggregated distance is reduced by 푁 given that every packet at the head of the
queue moves one step closer to its destination. Thus the change in total distance
to destination between time 푡 and 푡+ 1 is:
퐷(푆푡+1)−퐷(푆푡) = 휌휆ℓ¯푁 −푁. (3.5)
The critical load 휆∗ can be found when the total distance no longer decreases,
퐷(푆푡+1)−퐷(푆푡) = 0, which implies Equation (3.4). But this simple way can only
measure at which point the network system would begin to accumulate packets,
while it can not tell how congested the system is.
Another possible way to determine the critical load is to use Little’s law [108]:
“The average number of customers in a stable system (over some time interval)
is equal to their average arrival rate, multiplied by their average time in the
system”. Simply saying, in a steady state, the number of delivered packets is
equal to the number of generated packets.
d푆(푡)
d푡
= 휌휆푁 − 푆(푡)
휏¯(푡)
, (3.6)
where 휌휆푁 is the average arrival rate to the queues per unit of time, 푆(푡)/휏¯(푡)
is the number of packets delivered per simulation unit time with 휏¯(푡) being the
average End-to-End delay. If the load is low, the queues at each node tend to be
61
3.3 Topology and Traﬃc
empty and the average delay time can be approximated by the average shortest-
path:
휏¯(푡) ≈ ℓ¯. (3.7)
However if the load is high, the delay time can be approximated by the average
shortest-path length plus the time packets spend waiting in the queues.
휏¯(푡) ≈ ℓ¯+ 푇 (푆(푡), ℓ¯). (3.8)
3.3.2 Model for Regular-Symmetric Network
If the traﬃc is evenly distributed in a network and the network is not congested,
there exists a steady state solution 푆∗ for the number of packets in the network.
Each queue, on average, contains 푆∗/푁 packets and the delay can be approxi-
mated by




where on average, a packet visits ℓ¯ queues with average queue length of 푄¯. From
steady state solution (푑푆(푡)/푑푡 = 0) the total number of packets in the system is
푆∗ =
휌휆ℓ¯푁
1− 휌휆ℓ¯ . (3.10)





As the traﬃc load increases, the number of packets in the network increases
accordingly. At the congestion point the number of packets in the network di-
verges, 푆∗ → ∞, and the critical load is 휆∗ = 1/휌ℓ¯, which is also the same as
Equation (3.4).
3.3.3 General Solution
Notice from previous research that the transition from the free ﬂow phase to
the congested phase is well approximated by the equations above for the case of
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regular-symmetric networks, but not for other network topologies. For regular-
symmetric networks it gives a good approximation to the critical load because
the average queue size for all nodes is very similar. But in a scale-free network,
due to the heterogeneous structure, the importance of the nodes vary from each
other. If the more important nodes get congested, most part of the network
gets congested. An alternative approach is to use the betweenness centrality to
measure the node usage.
For example, in social network analysis, graph-theoretic concepts are used
to understand and explain social phenomena. A social network consists of a
set of actors, who may be arbitrary entities like persons or organizations, and
there exists one or more types of relations between them. A quantity of interest
in many social network studies is the “betweenness” of an actor 푤, which is
deﬁned as the total number of shortest paths between pairs of actors that pass
through 푤. This quantity is an indicator of who the most inﬂuential people in the
network are, the ones who control the ﬂow of information between most others.
The same concept can also be applied to the computer network where nodes are
connected through links. The load of a node or the whole network is aﬀected
by the ﬂow of packets through the communication network from their sources
to their destinations. The pattern of these ﬂows can be measured by looking
into the shortest-path that packets used while traveling. A common choice is
the betweenness centrality 퐶퐵 introduced in previous chapter. The nodes with
high betweenness centrality are relatively more important in the network as they
are visited by more routes. Consequently queues on them can be built up more
easily. It is expected that the removal of these nodes will worsen the network
performance. The nodes with high betweenness also result in the large increase
in average distance between others when they are removed.
So it is possible to use the betweenness and the Little’s law to obtain an
approximation of the onset of congestion when the routing is done using the
shortest–delay routes instead of the shortest paths. Firstly, the normalized be-






3.3 Topology and Traﬃc
where
∑
푣∈풱퐶퐵(푣) is the sum of all the nodes’ betweenness centrality in the
network. Then the average queue size at node 푤 can be approximated by
푄¯푤 ≈ 퐶ˆ퐵(푤)푆∗, (3.13)
where 푆∗ is the steady state solution of the number of packets in the network.
It is possible to approximate the average time a packet spends in all the queues
along its path, that is





where ℛ(푠, 푑) is the subset of nodes that the packet visits which depends on the
route calculation of routers. The average delay time is the propagation delay plus
the queueing delay:




















Here the queueing delay is considered the average delay along the chosen paths
for transmitting the data packets by the routers. The critical load in this general





It gives a very good approximation of the phase transition from free ﬂow phase
to congested phase for the general network topologies. It is not diﬃcult to see
Equation (3.17) also works for regular-symmetric networks. From Chapter 2, in
regular-symmetric networks 퐶퐵 is a constant for everynode. In this case, the





then 퐷 = ℓ¯/푁 according to Equation (2.8). Substituting 퐷 in Equation (3.17),
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Equation (3.4) is recovered.
3.4 Discussion – Network Invariants
The deﬁnition of an invariant in mathematics is: something that does not change
under a set of transformations. In the case of a network simulation, the invariants
are not very obvious as there are a few variables in the simulation, such as number
of nodes and links of the concerning network. The way of considering the invariant
of networks that catches most of the interests would be focusing on the scale of
the network. Would the characteristic of a small scale network be the same as
or similar to that of a large scale network? This is the question that is the focus
point of the following section.
A ﬁrst approach to search for invariants is to start with examining the topology
of the network. The approach would be to simplify the topology in the way
shown in Figure 3.2. The original network is split into diﬀerent regions, shown
as colored disks in the graph. In each region the network is a “tree” like subnet.
This means for nodes located inside one of these subnetworks, there is only one
path between them. By representing each tree with a super-node, the original
network becomes a network where all its nodes can be reached by more than
one path. This procedure is diﬀerent from dividing the Internet into domains, as
some domains will be split into diﬀerent subnets, and at AS-level some domains
form trees themselves.
But our interest lies not only in this kind of structural properties of the net-
work, but also in considering the traﬃc on it. The real world networks, for
example the Internet, are dynamic networks, either the topology or the traﬃc
in the network is changing all the time. The starting point to study network
topology and traﬃc invariant is to analyse the interaction between traﬃc and
topology. This interaction can be seen through the phase transition property of
networks, which indicates the network goes from free-ﬂow phase to congestion
phase as the network traﬃc load increases.
For the case of Regular-symmetric network [30; 31; 33], it is possible to pre-
dict the traﬃc load when congestion occurs, by only considering the average of
the shortest path lengths from all sources to all destinations. This prediction of
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Figure 3.2: A small portion of the router-level QMUL network obtained using
traceroute(upper) and the implication(lower)
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critical load does not depend on the concerning network size. Furthermore, the
general solution for predicting network critical load is also considered as an in-
variant for diﬀerent topologies. It can be used to predict the critical point where
networks go into congestion which depends on the size of the network.
The veriﬁcation of the critical load as an invariant can be done by examining
several metrics in network simulation. One of them is total number of packets
in the network system 푆(푡). It is the summary of all the queue lengths in the
network nodes 푆(푡) =
∑푁
푖=1푄푖(푡). In Figure 3.3, we verify the Little’s Law for
diﬀerent networks. In all cases the network have 푁 = 100 nodes. The coordinates
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Figure 3.3: Veriﬁcation of Little’s Law for diﬀerent network topologies.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, a closer look has been taken at the interaction between net-
work topology and network traﬃc. The consequence of the interaction is network
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performance under diﬀerent traﬃc loads. In free-ﬂow stage, packets can be trans-
ferred to its destination with small delays and the network throughput is high.
When the network traﬃc load passes the critical point, the network throughput
decreases signiﬁcantly and the packets arrival rate also decreases. At this point,
the network is considered congested.
To further examine this phase transition process, a simple solution, Little’s
Law and a general solution using betweenness centrality are introduced. Finally,
the concept of invariants for the networks are explained. All these serve as the





Previous researches have shown complex networks are sometimes vulnerable to
collapse [20; 24; 34; 35; 36]. Especially, Man-made complex networks such as
the Internet, power transmission grids and telephone systems are susceptible to
catastrophic failures in which the entire or most of the network ceases to function
[37; 38; 39; 109; 110]. A common mechanism behind this kind of failure is an
avalanche or cascade failure triggered by a wide variety of events, i.e. hardware
failure, software failure, human error, or intentional attacks.
In a network that carries ﬂows, such as data packets network, electricity power
grid, road transport network [111], social acquaintance network [112], its individ-
ual nodes experience a load. In normal circumstances, the load is not expected
to exceed the capacity that a node could handle. Most of the man-made net-
works are built to accommodate changes of network load and sometimes could
even react to topology changes. But from time to time, networks experience a
rare but destructive cascade failure. Cascade failures are initiated when a node
in the network is lost because of malfunction and overload. Then the network’s
load on that node will be redistributed to other nodes, i.e. the routing protocols
would recalculate the best route to redirect data packets. This redistribution of
the ﬂows may cause the load on other nodes to exceed their capacity. Even if
these newly overloaded nodes do not fail, the network would again try to avoid
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them by redistributing network traﬃc again. Hence the number of failed or heav-
ily overloaded nodes could increase, triggering an avalanche-like event. In the
worst case, the entire network may fail to function, or fragment into disconnected
subnetworks.
In communication networks, there are diﬀerent ways to eliminate network
congestion. An obvious approach to route packets through a network is to send
them through the shortest path. In the Internet, routing weights are placed on
links according to diﬀerent metrics. These weights are used to calculate shortest
paths and generate routing tables [113; 114]. Much work has been done in ﬁnding
better alternatives to shortest path routing [115; 116]. Although these routing
methods have shown considerable improvements in carrying capacity, that is the
load that can be carried by the network before jamming occurs. However, as
discovered by Sreenivasan et.al [117], there is a limit to how much improvement
may be made in this way. Besides all heavily loaded networks are at the end
vulnerable to cascade failure.
It is claimed that networks with heterogeneous node degree distribution, such
as scale-free networks, are much more likely to suﬀer from cascade failures [42; 87].
Because a small subset of core nodes are highly connected and manage much of
the traﬃc in a scale-free network. If one of these heavily connected core nodes
ceases to function, it will have a large impact on other nodes in the network.
However, similar catastrophic failures are also possible in networks with more
homogeneous degree distributions. If the network degree distribution has just a
small amount of heterogeneity, then avalanche-like breakdowns are possible when
all nodes are close to their failure load. Similar behavior has been seen in social
networks [39]. In the theoretical case of a completely homogeneous network in
which all nodes are close to their maximum load, failure of a single node could
cause the entire network to collapse in a single step.
In this chapter, we ﬁrstly introduce the computer network congestion collapse
and router failures. These simple failures in the network would sometimes prop-
agate through the network. We then introduce a novel, simple and successful
method to construct a “catastrophic network”, based on the calculation of be-
tweenness centrality to estimate the potential traﬃc load of network nodes. The
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catastrophic network built is a type of network that is designed to fail catastroph-
ically by avalanche-like (or cascade) breakdowns. We construct them by following
the cascade in reverse: adding a new node that is designed to be congested ﬁrst
in the new network and then add a subnetwork of nodes connecting to it. This
node serves as the bridge between the existing network and the subnetwork. The
“random growth” method is used in search of the possible topology that meet
all the requirements of the cascade. We ﬁnd out that the catastrophic network
generated using ”random growth” method has similar degree distribution as the
random network rather than power-law degree distribution. It indicates that a
random network also has the possibility to experience cascade failures.
4.2 Background and Motivation
Compared to its ancestor the ARPANET, the Internet is rapidly expanding and
becoming much more complex. With the growth of the Internet infrastructure,
the traﬃc it carries almost double every year [118]. In particular, the recent
introduction of video and voice applications has brought the biggest challenge yet
to the communication industry. Home users of the Internet take it for granted
to place VoIP calls using “Skype” or other instant messaging software, watch
shared videos on “YouTube”, or watch popular TV shows and movies using “BBC
iPlayer” or their video game consoles. Cooperate users on the other hand embrace
the Internet conference tools which intend to deliver high deﬁnition video and
voice, for example the Cisco’s “TelePresence” which provides high-deﬁnition video
and spatial audio. What is even more unexpected is the introduction of the third
generation mobile network, which enables users to stream multimedia content
right to their mobile handset known as the smart phones. The trend of multimedia
communication and entertainment will dominate the network traﬃc in the coming
years. With this trend comes the same old problem congestion and even failure
of the network.
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4.2.1 Congestion Collapse
In the early years of the Internet, it was mainly deployed in universities where
every September the network suﬀered congestion collapse due to the coming back
of the students which increased network traﬃc dramatically. Four congestion
control algorithms: slow start, congestion avoidance, fast retransmit and fast
recovery were introduced by Van Jacobson to solve this problem [98; 119]. They
have been implemented in the TCP to control the congestion. During the peak
period, more packets would be sent to the network than it could handle. Thus
routers will pile up packets in their buﬀers known as queues, which are designed to
be cleared up later. In a more extreme situation when the queues are overloaded,
the routers will begin to discard incoming packets. The control mechanism of
TCP will kick start to tell the traﬃc sources to slow down the transmissions.
This feedback control behavior of TCP is vital for the operation of the Internet
that we rely on. In RFC 2914 [99], best current practice for congestion control
in the Internet is described.
Consider a simple example of congestion collapse [105]. Figure 4.1 (a) shows
two subnets (Subnet1 and Subnet2) with two hosts in each of them. Host1
sends data to Host4, while Host2 sends data to Host3, and both sources always
send as much as possible (100 kbps). There is no congestion control in place.
Administrator will notice that Subnet1’s outgoing link is not fully utilized (2×100
kbps is only 2/3 of the link capacity). Thus, a decision is made to upgrade the link
from Host1 to the Router1 to 1 Mbps. Since both sources keep increasing their
rates without concerning the bandwidth, there will be congestion at Router1.
Figure 4.1 (b) shows the queue builds up on Router1 which has more packets
from Host1. Roughly, for every packet from Host2, there are 10 packets from
Host1. This means that the packets from Host1 unnecessarily occupy bandwidth
of the bottleneck inter-router link that could be used by the data ﬂow from Host2.
The more the Host1 sends, the greater this problem becomes.
With the rapid increase of streaming traﬃc, the best eﬀort oriented Inter-
net may not guarantee that video and voice will stream smoothly to the user.
Firstly, routers discard packets randomly which may cause some of the stream-
ing transmission to stall [120]. Secondly, the packets that are queued because of
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.1: Simple network scenario to analyse congestion collapse.
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overloading experienced substantial and non-uniform delays, signiﬁcantly reduc-
ing throughput and may worsen the congestion. This may be the result of the
fundamental design of the Internet and its topology. The main idea of the origi-
nal Internet design was to share the available network infrastructure by sending
data as small independent packets which though they might arrive at diﬀerent
times, would still generally make it to their destinations. Consider a typical
router that receives two packets with the same source and destination address
and port, it would examine the two packets separately and enquire the routing
table twice. This same CPU intensive process repeats again and again even with
packets belong to the same stream.
Surprisingly, we are not experiencing unacceptable VoIP calls and online
videos. This is because the Internet has been over-provisioned by the Telecoms.
ISPs (Internet Service Provider) used to deploy extra equipment to cope with
traﬃc spikes. But recently they cannot install new equipment fast enough, due
to high cost of hardware, energy bills and environmental issues. ISPs tend to
push the existing infrastructure to their operating limits. Although this is cost
eﬀective, but sometimes it is not a safe and easy way to operate the network.
One of the potential risk is network failure due to congestion.
Besides, there are increasing amount of video and voice traﬃc in today’s
network because of our growing demand of multimedia entertainment. These
traﬃc usually use UDP as their transport protocol. UDP provides a minimal,
unreliable, best-eﬀort, message-passing transport protocol. Diﬀerent from TCP,
it does not establish end-to-end connections between communicating end systems.
That’s why UDP can oﬀer a very eﬃcient communication transport for streaming
applications. But on the other hand, UDP provides no inherent congestion control
mechanisms. Many systems can send UDP packets at the line speed of the link
interface, which is often much greater than the available path capacity, and doing
so contributes to the congestion all along the path.
4.2.2 Router Failures
A router is specialized hardware/software equipment that routes packets to their
desired destination [73; 76]. Because of their design, manufacturing and redun-
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dancy deployment, a router is actually very reliable that it seldom fails by hard-
ware faults. But on the other hand, because of its vital role in the Internet, it is
always generating problems and targeted by attacks.
Causing a router to fail can be done by exhausting its available resources. The
simplest problem with some routers are software bugs which cause the router
operating system to crash or hacked. For example, there is a buﬀer-overﬂow
attack that jams the buﬀer with spurious packets. These packets might be caused
by “Ping” ﬂow generated by a “Bot-net” with millions of controlled “Zombies”
(hacked computers). Sometimes a router may be stalled by the sheer amount of
traﬃc going through which cause the memory overﬂow. There are of course many
other ways to exhaust a router’s resources, but we are emphasizing congestion
related ones.
An example of the recent router failure in the Internet is the widespread out-
age of Gmail’s web interface in September 2009 [1]. It is known that many people
rely on Gmail or other online mail system for personal and professional commu-
nications. The interesting point for us is not how bad everyone is aﬀected by the
lack of Email services, but rather the cause and the spread of the failure. From
the announcement of the Gmail oﬃcial blog, the outage happened as follows.
Firstly, Google took a small fraction of Gmail’s servers oﬄine to perform rou-
tine upgrades. But this isn’t itself a problem, web services providers do this all
the time, because Gmail web service servers run in many locations with request
routers. These routers simply send traﬃc to other locations when one is oﬄine.
However, Google had underestimated the load on the routers that was upgrad-
ing. They designed these routers to improve service availability by directing web
queries to the appropriate Gmail server for response. But a few of the request
routers became overloaded because of planned maintenance on a small fraction
of servers. In eﬀect they told the rest of the routers in the system to stop sending
them traﬃc because they are too slow. This transferred the load onto the re-
maining routers, causing a few more of them to become overloaded, too. Within
minutes, nearly all of the request routers were overloaded. As a result, people
couldn’t access Gmail via the web interface because their requests couldn’t be
routed to any Gmail servers.
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The Gmail engineering team was alerted to the failures within seconds but
without solving it immediately and eﬃciently. After establishing that the core
problem was insuﬃcient available capacity, they brought a large amount of addi-
tional routers online to distribute the traﬃc across their network. We notice that
this simple but costly solution is to increase the network capacity well beyond the
demand to provide more resource. But not every service provider or company can
aﬀord this, neither the cost of equipment nor the energy. It is claimed by Google
that their routers do not have enough failure isolation (i.e. if there’s a problem
in one data center, it shouldn’t aﬀect services in another datacenter) and do not
degrade gracefully (e.g. if many request routers are overloaded simultaneously,
they all should just get slower instead of refusing traﬃc and shifting their load).
Although the Gmail server network is an overlay network, the event shown
the possibility that might congestion spread throughout the whole network. In
the following sections, we try to investigate the potential congestion failures and
sometimes cascade failures by generating a special kind of network topology.
4.3 Building Catastrophic Networks
4.3.1 Previous Studies
The method used by researchers to study cascade failures is to overload one or
more nodes in a pre-existing network and study the resulting cascade [39; 42;
43]. Holme and Kim [40] have a slightly diﬀerent approach, evolving a scale-free
network until cascade failure occurs due to the increasing load in the network. In
[43; 44], breakdown is simulated by computer, whereas [39; 42] use mathematical
models. One diﬃculty of the former approaches [40; 43; 44] is that this type
of simulation is very computationally demanding and unpredictable. It may also
imposes a limit on the size of network that can be modeled. This makes it diﬃcult
to ﬁnd out how well the mathematical models scale with network size. In our
recent paper [121], a new way to study cascading failure has been approached
from another direction. The building of networks in such a way as to ensure
their breakdowns in essence follow the cascading breakdown in reverse. By doing
so, it is hoped that one can have a better understanding of the dynamics of the
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process. This approach is also less computationally demanding and will therefore
allow the simulation of larger networks. The model can also be easily extended
to real-world networks.
4.3.2 Proposed Method
The model for building a new set of networks with cascading failure properties
is introduced in this section [121]. The method is to simulate an avalanche-like
failure in reverse, building a network that is designed to fail by cascading break-
down. This model, which is the simplest one, focuses primarily on networks with
a single type of nodes and undirected unweighted edge. The generalization to
more complicated network types are certainly possible. There are two central
features of our method that distinguish it from other researchers’ approaches.
First, it approaches the network congestion and failure from a “growing” point
of view, whereas most of other researches try to study the robustness of existing
network topologies. From the “growing” of the cascade network topology, one
can investigate the pattern and properties of network congestion more clearly,
because cascade networks are designed to fail. It can also be used to examine
exiting networks’ robustness. Secondly, most of the network topology generation
methods are node degree related, such as the famous ER-model and BA scale-free
model. Instead of considering the degree, the method proposed takes the node
betweenness centrality as the measure on step basis, while the method bases on
edge betweenness could be considered in the future implementations. Gener-
ally, the model is based on two critical processes: “Growing” and “Subnetwork
Attachment”.
4.3.3 Betweenness Centrality and Network Load
To further study the congestion behaviour of networks, we correlate the topol-
ogy of the network with the traﬃc that it carries via a routing mechanism. The
simplest routing mechanism is to deliver the packets through the shortest paths
connecting a source and destination node in the network. The load on a par-
ticular node 푤 can be approximated by counting the fraction of shortest paths
that pass through it. This approximation is given by the betweenness centrality
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퐶퐵. Suppose the network is working very eﬃciently and that the traﬃc in it is
distributed evenly throughout all shortest paths by the routing protocols. Then
we again use the normalized betweenness centrality of a node 푤 in the network





For simplicity we consider that each node 푤 in the network produces packets at
the same rate Λ푤 = Λ, distributed evenly between the 푁 − 1 destination nodes
available. The total ﬂow in the network, 퐹 (Λ, 푁), increases linearly with the
network size 퐹 (Λ, 푁) = 푁Λ.
Congestion happens in the network when node 푤 becomes overloaded. That
is the packet arrival rate to node 푤, 휆푤, is equal to or larger than its packet
service rate, 휇푤. The average number of packets that arrive to node 푤 is [44]
휆푤 = Λ푁ℓ¯퐶ˆ퐵(푤) =
Λ퐶퐵(푤)
푁 − 1 , (4.2)
where 푁 is the number of nodes, Λ푁 is the number of packets generated in one
unit time by the whole network, ℓ¯ is the average shortest path of the network
to account for the average number of packets that were produced in the past
and they are still in transit. And 퐶ˆ퐵(푤) is the proportion of all the packets in
transit that pass through the node 푤. Equation (4.2) is obtained by relating the
topology of the networks via 퐶퐵 with the traﬃc that it carries via Λ. Besides,
one of the properties of betweenness is also used:∑
푤∈풱
퐶퐵(푤) = 푁(푁 − 1)ℓ¯ (4.3)
This can be understood by performing the sum on the left-hand side of the
equation in a diﬀerent order: taking each node pair in the network and counting
which node’s betweennesses they contribute to [121].
As all the nodes produce the same amount of traﬃc Λ, from Equation (4.2),
the condition of congestion is the critical network traﬃc generation rate (critical
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load of the network) Λ∗:
Λ∗ ≥ 휇푤(푁 − 1)
퐶퐵(푤)
. (4.4)
Previous work shows that this congestion model can be used to study the robust-
ness of mission critical networks [122].
4.3.4 Cascading Failures
When nodes in the network are getting congested, an avalanche might happen in
some cases. We consider overload as the cause of node failure. The model for the
avalanche is: when a node becomes congested, all links connected to it and the
node itself will be removed from the network. Also any traﬃc generated by the
failing node is removed, see Figure 4.2. This means that the node and its links
cannot serve the incoming packets anymore and send out no more packets to the
network. After the removal, traﬃc in the network is redistributed by routing
protocols by means of recalculating the routes. Thus loads on other nodes might
increase and they might also suﬀer from overloading. These newly congested
nodes would be removed from the network and the traﬃc is redistributed again.
This process will go on until no nodes in the network is overloaded. In a large
cascade, the network will break down into many disconnected subnetworks [41].
4.3.5 Network Segmentation
The idea of building a catastrophic network is to follow the avalanche process
in reverse. Starting with one or more small “seed” networks, the catastrophic
network is built step by step. Suppose during building step 푖, we add a node 푛푖푓
and connect it to the existing network 퐴. And we target to make 푛푖푓 to congest
ﬁrst in this step. To achieve this, a subnetwork of nodes and links also need to be
added. This subnetwork 퐵 should be connected to 푛푖푓 only and has no connection
to 퐴. In this way 푛푖푓 is designed to be the bridge between the existing network
and the newly added sub–network. So that shortest paths between nodes in 퐴
and 퐵 must pass through node 푛푖푓 which would have higher load.
Thus at each step, a new “congestion” node 푛푖푓 is added at ﬁrst (see Fig. 4.3).
Then this node is connected to the existing network 퐴 that contains 푁퐴 nodes.
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Figure 4.2: Example of network cascade the original network (a) has 57 nodes. If
node 56 shown in red is congested, its links would be removed from the network.
Then the load is redistributed, making a sequence of node (also shown in red) to
be congested and their links removed. In a extreme case, the network is broken
down into disconnected subnetworks.
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The sub–network 퐵 with 푁퐵 nodes is introduced and connected to 푛
푖
푓 . In this
way, three parts are examined at each step, 퐴, 퐵 and 푛푖푓 . The main diﬃculty
then lies in how could we ﬁnd out the set of connections between 푛푖푓 and 퐴 and
the topology of 퐵 with connections to 푛푖푓 eﬃciently.












Figure 4.3: Schematic representation of the method to build the network cascade
in reverse.
4.3.6 Basic Building Steps
The basic steps for building the catastrophic networks is to start with a small
seed network. It could be diﬀerent kinds of network, i.e. ER random network.
Then at every growing step, we follow:
∙ For a new growing step 푖+1, the new network 퐺푖+1 can be divided into three
parts. The subnetwork 퐴 which is the network 퐺푖 from the last growing
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step 푖, new node 푛푖+1푓 which is designed to congest ﬁrst in the new network,
and the new subnetwork 퐵.
∙ Connect 푛푖+1푓 to subnetwork 퐴 with number of links ranging from 1 to 푁퐴.
∙ Generate a small size random network with network size starts from one
as subnetwork 퐵 and connect it to node 푛푖+1푓 . We must try diﬀerent sub-
network 퐵 and make sure 푛푖+1푓 is the ﬁrst node to congest in 퐺푖+1 and the
congested load of 푛푖+1푓 is close to 푛
푖
푓 .
∙ 푛푖+1푓 acts like a bridge between subnetwork 퐴 and 퐵. In this way, there is
no direct connection between 퐴 and 퐵 and 푛푖+1푓 has very high betweenness
centrality.
The resulting network will have the property to congest at the designed load and
a cascade failure would happen when it reaches this load.
Note that from the growing methodology, the whole network load will increase
following the growth of the network. In the constructed catastrophic network, if
node 푛푖+1푓 gets congested when
퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ) = 휇푛푖+1푓
(푁 푖+1 − 1)/Λ∗, (4.5)
node 푛푖+1푓 and its edges will be removed. Node 푛
푖
푓 becomes the next congested
node in the cascade-down network. 푛푖푓 has
퐶퐵(푛
푖
푓 ) = 휇푛푖푓 (푁
푖 − 1)/Λ∗, (4.6)
where 퐶퐵(푛
푖
푓 ) is the betweenness of node 푛
푖
푓 in the reduced network and 푁
푖 is
the reduced network size. Hence 퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ) and 퐶퐵(푛
푖
푓 ) must satisfy the following
equation for the cascade to happen.
퐶퐵(푛
푖+1










To start with a simple case, we supposed that the service rate for all nodes
in the network is the same, one packet in a unit time 휇 = 1. A bound of the
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betweenness centrality of node 푛푖푓 in each growing step could be obtained using
Equation (4.2). In this case the node with the highest critical load is also the node
with the largest betweenness centrality. If the average betweenness centrality in





퐶퐵(푤) = (푁 − 1)ℓ¯, (4.8)
and the maximum betweenness 퐶퐵(푚푎푥) = 푚푎푥{퐶퐵(푤), 푤 ∈ 푉 }. A lower bound
for the maximum betweenness centrality 퐶퐵(푚푎푥) is [94] :
퐶퐵(푚푎푥) ≥ (푁 − 1)ℓ¯. (4.9)
From the growing methodology, we want node 푛푖푓 to be the ﬁrst to congest in each
growing step. Hence, 퐶퐵(푛
푖
푓 ) ≥ (푁 − 1)ℓ¯. During the growing step, if 퐶퐵(푛푖푓 )
reaches this lower bound, the growing would stop, because 푛푖푓 would not be the
ﬁrst node to become congested.
Notice that the node with the largest betweenness centrality would be the
ﬁrst to become congested and the network critical load must be greater than or
equal to that of the network of previous step
Λ∗(푛푖+1푓 ) ≥ Λ∗(푛푖푓 ) ≥ ... ≥ Λ∗(푠푒푒푑), (4.10)
where Λ∗(푠푒푒푑) is the network critical load of the seed network. In this case, also
using Equation (4.2), we have:








An upper boundary for the maximum betweenness centrality in the network for
every growing step can obtained:
퐶퐵(푛
푖
푓 ) = 퐶퐵(푚푎푥) ≤ (푁 − 1)/휆∗(푠푒푒푑). (4.12)
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4.4 Random Growing Method
Following the two basic steps to create a catastrophic network: “Growing” and
“failure node and subnetwork attachment”, the straight forward way of ﬁnding
the solution is to generate a random subnetwork 퐵 and also randomly connect
푛푖푓 to the subnetwork 퐴 and subnetwork 퐵 (see Figure 4.3). The random con-
nection is done until the condition Λ∗(푛푖+1푓 ) ≥ Λ∗(푛푖푓 ) and 퐶퐵(푛푖+1푓 ) ≥ 퐶퐵(푖)
(푖 = 1, ..., 푁 푖+1) are met. These are the two boundary conditions stated in the
last section. To guarantee that the cascade process is able to be reversed, in the
random growing method we need to make sure:
∙ New nodes in subnetwork 퐵 can only be linked to 푛푖푓 and the newly added
subnetwork 퐵 nodes.
∙ New links can be added between the subnetwork 퐴 and 푛푖푓 ; between 푛푖푓 and
nodes subnetwork 퐵; between nodes in subnetwork 퐵.
These rules make sure that there is no direct links between nodes in 퐴 and 퐵.
This results in a dramatic increase of the betweenness centrality of node 푛푖푓 , where
a large number of shortest-paths have to go through it.
4.4.1 Seed Networks
The seed networks from which the catastrophic networks are constructed have
an impact on the resulting network topology, because the metric for growing the
catastrophic network is the betweenness centrality. Although the betweenness
centrality will change dramatically during the growing process, network generated
at each step always depends on the betweenness of previous step, which would
ﬁnally depend on those of the seed network. Also from the node degree point
of view, seed network’s structure could change the overall connectivity of the
resulting catastrophic network by satisfying the betweenness centrality condition
during the growing. Five diﬀerent seed networks are used in the random growing
method: a 6 node star-shape network, a 7 node two-stars shape network, a 12
node star-chain shape network, a 12 node three-stars shape network, and an ER
random network (see Figure 4.4).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.4: (a) The seed networks used by the random growth method to generate
catastrophic networks. (b) small random seed network.
85
4.4 Random Growing Method
The star-shape networks are chosen because nodes in them have very extreme
betweenness centrality values. The star-shape network has two kinds of nodes:
the center node 푛푐 and ray nodes 푛푟. The betweenness centrality of the rays of a
star network is given by 퐶퐵(푛푟) = 푁 −1, while the well-connected center node of
the star has the betweenness centrality 퐶퐵(푛푐) = (푁 − 1)2. The center node will
become congested at the critical packet production rate Λ∗푛푐 = (푁 − 1)/퐶퐵(푛푐).
Besides, many of the small size computer networks form a star shape topology
with the center of the star the head oﬃce and the rays are the branches. We
also use the two-stars, three-stars and chain network as more complicated seeds.
In contrast, we also use small random network where betweenness centrality of
nodes are relatively similar.
4.4.2 Random Growth Results
A 73-node catastrophic network grown from a 6 node star-shape seed network
is shown in Figure 4.5. The growing steps of this network is brieﬂy shown in
Figure 4.6. Starting with the seed network (Figure 4.6(a)). Figure 4.6(b) in the
second step of the growing the programme added one congest node (in red) and
subnetwork (two bottom nodes in yellow) with their connections. At later steps,
the catastrophic networks at the 24th step with 43 nodes (Figure 4.6(c)) and the
49th step with 73 nodes (Figure 4.6(d)) the networks are much larger with dense
connections between their nodes.
To further investigate the property of this catastrophic network built using
the random growing method, we ﬁrst examine the betweenness centrality of 푛푖푓
for each growing step. In Figure 4.7 the maximum betweenness (that is the
betweenness of node 푛푖푓 ) is plotted against the network size. The line with
short bars shows the maximum betweenness of 푛푖푓 at each growing step; the line
with stars represents the lower boundary; and the line with crosses shows the
upper boundary. At each step in the building of the catastrophic network, the









, otherwise the avalanche will not occur.
Finding a network satisfying these conditions is not always possible. A net-
work that becomes congested at the target load Λ∗ is always harder to ﬁnd as
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Figure 4.5: The 73-node catastrophic network generated using the random growth
method
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4.6: The process of building catastrophic network: (a) is the seed network
to start the growth of catastrophic network. (b), (c) and (d) are the catastrophic
networks at the second step of the growth with 9 nodes, 24th step with 43 nodes
and 49th step with 73 nodes. They are all plotted using Pajek [4].
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the network grows bigger. This explains the divergence of 퐶퐵(푛
푖
푓 ) from the up-
per limit. In Figure 4.7, the betweenness centrality of the congested node 푛푖푓
for the ﬁrst few steps follow the upper boundary closely. But the betweenness
centrality value deviates from the upper boundary when the network size reaches
20 nodes and even further when the network grows bigger. The reduction in the
betweenness centrality growth might be due to the random process introduced in
choosing: subnetwork 퐵, the connections between subnetwork 퐵 and 푛푖푓 , and the
connections between subnetwork 퐴 and 푛푖푓 . One of the conditions set would allow
Λ∗(푛푖+1푓 ) ∈ (Λ∗(푛푖푓 ), 1), which means the load of the new network 퐺푖+1 could be
much larger than that of 퐺푖. When the load of the network reaches 1 we cannot
grow it anymore, because the network is a hundred percent utilized. It is also no-
ticed that the betweenness centrality grows with the network size. If the growth
of betweenness centrality is not following the upper boundary which is the ideal
solution, the maximum betweeness centrality of the network will sooner or later
reach the lower bound. In this case, we cannot grow the catastrophic network
anymore. Because if node 푛푖푓 ’s betweenness is less than the lower boundary, it
would not be the ﬁrst node to congest in the network. This puts a limit on the
growing of catastrophic network.
We take a closer look at the change of network load and the shortest path
length which link to the boundary conditions, see Figure 4.8. The average short-
est path length starts with a growth and stays between 2.2 and 2.5 when the
network size is below 45 nodes. After that, the average shortest path in the net-
work experiences a constant drop. It means the network is getting very dense
that one node can reach the other one in just one or two hops. In the ideal sit-
uation, the critical load of the catastrophic network in each growing step should
follow the target load, which is the congestion load of the seed network. But
again due to the randomness introduced , it is hard to ﬁnd the solution due to
growing complexity to calculative network topology and the betweenness central-
ity. From Figure 4.8(b), the congestion load keeps increasing with the growing of
the network and has the trend of reaching 1 when the network is large enough.
Degree distribution and cumulative degree distribution of two 73 node catas-
trophic networks are also shown in Figure 4.9. The degree distribution is ap-
proximately following a bell shape. It shows that these catastrophic networks are
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Figure 4.7: The maximum value of betweenness centrality as a function of the
numbering of nodes
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.8: (a) the change of average shortest-path length during the growth. (b)
the change of critical load during the growth. It is drifting away from the target
load.
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more like random networks with most of their node having 10 to 15 links each.
The cumulative degree distribution also shows that they are closer to a random
network structure.
4.4.3 Catastrophic Networks Growing from Other Seed
Networks
To further examine the growth process we have evaluated other seed networks:
two-stars shape network, three-stars shape network, chain shape network and
ER random network. These examples of the catastrophic network built using the
random growing method are shown in Appendix A. The betweenness centrality
growth and degree distribution of the resulting catastrophic networks built upon
diﬀerent seed networks are show in Figures (A.1,A.2,A.3,A.3) in Appendix A.
4.4.4 Discussion
From all the results shown in this chapter, growing a catastrophic network is not
a fast process. Firstly, it is time and resource consuming to search in the random
space for all possible subnetwork 퐵 and connections between 퐴 and 푛푖푓 , 퐵 and 푛
푖
푓
that meet the growing conditions. Secondly, the random growing method is not
very precise as more often it misses the ideal target condition for congestion. One
of the indication is the reduction in the betweenness centrality growth, which can
be found in most of the catastrophic networks built with diﬀerent seed network
type.
But it is already a big step forward from previous researches. In that, no
previous research has grown a network that will fail catastrophically under certain
traﬃc loads. Further, the size of networks is reaching 150, which can be seen as
a mid-size router-level network inside an AS. Thirdly, the degree distribution of
the catastrophic networks depends the seed network structure and the random
process introduced.
We have also noticed that it is possible to construct networks in which the
service rate 휇 is not the same for all nodes. This might make it possible to build
networks in which avalanches begin at nodes having a heavy traﬃc load while the
92
4.4 Random Growing Method
(a)
(b)
Figure 4.9: The degree distribution (a) and the cumulative degree distribution
(b) of the 73-node catastrophic networks.
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remaining nodes are having a lighter traﬃc. Networks with nodes of diﬀerent ser-
vice rates could better simulate man-made networks. For example, the Internet or
the power grids where a core router or an electrical substation has a large output
traﬃc ﬂow but not many links and consequently have a more “important” role
in the network. Failure may begin with a node with high betweenness centrality,
but the next node to fail in the avalanche may have a relatively small centrality,
yet depending on the propagation of the avalanche through load redistribution.
In this case the node betweenness might not reﬂect its importance in the cascade
sequence. This behavior is illustrated in Figure 4.10, which is a specially con-
structed network. In this network normal unmark nodes handle one packet per
unit time, Node B handle twice the rate at two packets per unit time. Node A,
C and D can handle twice the ﬂow B can. The radius of the nodes in the ﬁgure
are proportional to the square root of their betweenness centrality. When the
network traﬃc reaches the critical load, nodes fail in sequence: A, B, C, D, even
though node C and D can handle twice the ﬂow node B can. It is found out that
the order of failure is unrelated to the betweenness centrality of a node. Due to
the limitations of resource and time available, more in-depth research is needed
to build the diﬀerent service rate catastrophic network topology in the future.
Figure 4.10: Catastrophic network with heterogeneous nodes
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4.4.5 Comparison with Random and Scale-free Networks
The catastrophic networks generated using the “random growth” method used
a random process. On the other hand, this method also introduces bias when
adding in a node 푛푖푓 at each step to meet betweenness centrality conditions. To
ﬁnd out the characteristic of this special family of catastrophic networks, we
select one catastrophic network generated with 73 nodes (Figure 4.5). We try to
compare it with a random network and a BA scale-free network of the same size,
see Figure 4.11.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.11: Network topology of a 73 node (a) ER random network and (b) BA
scale-free network.
Network Type 푁 퐿 푘 푘푚푎푥 퐶퐵(푚푎푥) ℓ¯
Catastrophic Network 73 452 12.3 17 167.4 1.9
Random Network 73 422 11.6 20 244 2.0
Scale-free Network 73 257 7.0 29 989 2.2
Table 4.1: Comparison of topological properties of 73-node catastrophic, random
and scale-free network.
By looking at the topology through plotting in the ﬁgures, it is not easy to
tell the diﬀerence between these networks. Thus we analyse their topological
properties in detail which are shown in Table 4.1. These three networks have the
same number of nodes 푁 . We calculate in our network analysis program: 퐿 the
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number of links in the network, 푘¯ average degree of nodes, 푘푚푎푥 maximum node
degree, 퐶퐵(푚푎푥) maximum betweenness centrality and ℓ¯ average shortest path
length.
This family of catastrophic networks has very similar topological properties as
those of random networks. Structurally, the catastrophic network is very similar
to a random network. But their diﬀerence lies in the maximum betweenness cen-
trality value. The catastrophic network has even smaller maximum betweenness
centrality than that of the random network, and ﬁve times smaller than that of a
scale-free network. This is because of the random process introduced during the
catastrophic network building process.
To further conﬁrm this, Figure 4.12 shows the node degree distribution and the
betweenness centrality of nodes against the node sequence number when they were
added to network. We could see that degree distribution and the betweenness
centrality of the catastrophic network and random network are quite similar,
which signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the ones of the scale-free network. Although
this kind of catastrophic network looks like a random network, given a random
network we still cannot tell whether it would fail catastrophically or not. And
the cascade depends on the ﬁrst node to congest in the concerning network and
the way the load is redistribution afterwards.
4.5 Conclusion
A simple mechanism for building networks designed to fail catastrophically has
been presented. The technique could be improved to better build such catas-
trophic networks. It has the potential to construct networks with nodes that
have diﬀerent service rates where they have low topological importance (or cen-
trality) but are crucial in the catastrophe. In the case where total ﬂow in the
network increases linearly with the network size, it is found that the network has
a small amount of heterogeneity in its node degree distribution. This shows that
catastrophic failure does not only occur in highly heterogeneous networks like the
Internet. If all nodes have similar loads and are close to their failure threshold,
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Figure 4.12: Comparison of the network degree distribution and betweenness
centrality of nodes. (a) degree distribution of catastrophic network (left) ran-
dom network (middle) and scale-free network (right). (b) betweenness centrality




To further improve this method, modiﬁcation can be made that the generated
networks have more realistic topologies. There are many ways to extend the
method. Other measures of centrality representing diﬀerent ﬂow mechanisms
could be used, and more complicated routing mechanisms other than pure shortest
path might be considered. Another possibility is to allow the creation of edges
between nodes that do not get congested.
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Chapter 5
An Eﬃcient Method to Build
Catastrophe: A Family of
Catastrophic Networks
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we consider a type of catastrophic network built using
the random growing method. It is relatively easy to implement and generate
results. However as the catastrophic networks are constructed, there is a drift
of the traﬃc production rate from its maximum value which implies a bound
on the size of the network. The random growing method has its limitation for
building catastrophic networks. The reliability and eﬃciency of this model make
it diﬃcult and time consuming to generate large-scale topologies. Alternative
methods are needed to improve the random growing method. Therefore in this
chapter, we present a new method based on the “branch and bound” approach,
to speed up the construction of catastrophic networks. We introduced bounds
to eliminate unsuitable solutions and introduced a better search algorithm for
catastrophic networks. It is shown that using the optimized “branch and bound”
method, we can generate a special family of catastrophic networks with two types









Figure 5.1: Segmentation of the network in each growing step.
Recall the network segmentation introduced in the last chapter that we divide
the network into three parts, Figure 5.1. They are: the network 퐴 from last step,
푛푖푓 the node that is designed to congest ﬁrst at this step, and the subnetwork 퐵
that is added. At the 푖푡ℎ–step of the reverse–avalanche process, when the node
푛푖푓 congests (Equation (4.4)), we have
퐶퐵(푛
푖
푓 ) = 휇푛푖푓 (푁퐴 − 1)/Λ∗. (5.1)
In this case, node 푛푖푓 overloads if the average packet–production rate is Λ푛푖푓 = Λ
∗.
However, for the given Λ∗ we may not able to ﬁnd a network with 푛푖+1푓 at the
next step. Nevertheless we may ﬁnd that node 푛푖+1푓 would fail when
Λ푛푖+1푓
≥ Λ푛푖푓 . (5.2)
This is the situation we encountered when building the catastrophic network
using the random growing method.
Assume that the average packet load for all the nodes is Λ푛푖+1푓
, then it will
guarantee that at the 푖푡ℎ and (푖+ 1)푡ℎ step both node 푛푖푓 and 푛
푖+1
푓 will overload.
In other words, to construct the avalanche in reverse requires an increase on the
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average packet load. This observation with Equation (5.1) and Equation (5.2)
implies that
0 ≤ 퐶퐵(푛푖+1푓 )−
휇푛푖+1푓
(푁퐴 +푁퐵)
휇푛푖푓 (푁퐴 − 1)
퐶퐵(푛
푖
푓 ) ≤ 휖. (5.3)
where 휖 ≥ 0 is a small number and the size of the network at (푖 + 1)푡ℎ step is
(푁퐴 + 푁퐵 + 1). In this chapter, we try to ﬁnd the solution that minimizes 휖 at
each step of the inverse–cascade process.
This leads us to search for possible boundaries and conditions that could
eliminate unsuitable topology solutions which will reduce the searching space for
catastrophic networks. Using a similar process as introduced in previous chapter,
the catastrophic network is also built by following the avalanche in reverse. First
by dividing the network into three subnetworks, the betweenness centrality of
node 푛푖푓 can be split into diﬀerent contributions from these subnetworks because
of the addictive property of the betweenness centrality.
∙ 푁퐴 is the number of shortest paths that start from 푛푖+1푓 and end in 퐴
∙ 푁퐵 is the number of shortest paths that start from 푛푖+1푓 and end in 퐵
∙ 2푁퐴푁퐵 is the number of shortest paths that start in 퐴 and end in 퐵 which
correspond to 푁퐴 sources going to 푁퐵 destinations (and vice versa).
∙ 퐶퐵(퐴) is the number of paths that start and end in 퐴 and they go through
node 푛푖+1푓
∙ Similarly, 퐶퐵(퐵) is the number of paths that start and end in 퐵 and they
go through node 푛푖+1푓 .
Then the betweenness centrality of 푛푖푓 can be written as
퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ) = 퐶퐵(퐴) + 퐶퐵(퐵) +푁퐴 +푁퐵 + 2푁퐴푁퐵, (5.4)
To obtain the desired 퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ), which satisﬁes Equation (5.3) and minimizes
휖, one can either change the linkage between subnetwork 퐴 and 푛푖+1푓 or change
the topology of 퐵 and its linkage to 푛푖+1푓 . Because 푁퐴 is the size of the network
from previous growing step, it will not change in the corresponding growing step.
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Therefore there are three variables left in Equation (5.4) associated with these
changes: 퐶퐵(퐴), 퐶퐵(퐵), and 푁퐵. To speed up the search for the new catastrophic
network topology that meet the conditions set, it is more eﬃcient to ﬁnd out the
bounds for the solution space. With our improvement to set the boundary and
search conditions, at each growing step, the program does not have to examine
every possible topology. In the next few sections, we are going to investigate the
possible boundaries and conditions for the three variables in 퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ).
5.3 Branch and Bound Method: Bound for Sub-
network 퐵
When adding the subnetwork 퐵 during the random growing process, we start
with a network topology with one node, then two nodes, and so on. If we want to
reduce the time searching for possible topologies for subnetwork 퐵, the obvious
solution is to ﬁnd an upper limit for the size of subnetwork 퐵. In this section,
we are going to set a bound for 푁퐵, the number of nodes in subnetwork 퐵.
Firstly suppose there is no subnetwork 퐴 connecting to 푛푖+1푓 , see Figure 5.2.
In this separated network, we try to investigate how the topology of subnetwork
퐵 would aﬀect 퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ). Because there is no subnetwork 퐴, 퐶퐵(퐴) = 0. Sub-
network 퐴 does not contribute to 퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ), therefore there are no shortest paths
that start and end in 퐴 past through 푛푖+1푓 . So if subnetwork 퐵 and 푛
푖+1
푓 forms
a star-shape network with 푛푖+1푓 as its center, 퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ) would reach its maximum
value 퐶퐵(퐵푚푎푥) = 푁퐵(푁퐵 − 1), because all nodes need to use the center node to
get to each other. Using Equations (5.3) and (5.4), we have
푁2퐵훼 +푁퐵(2푁퐴훼− 퐶퐵(푛푓 )휇푛푖+1푓 ) +푁퐴(훼− 퐶퐵(푛푓 )휇푛푖+1푓 ) ≤ 휖. (5.5)
where 훼 = (푁퐴 − 1)휇푛푖+1푓 > 0. Therefore we can calculate the maximum 푁퐵.
Furthermore, the minimum value of 퐶퐵(퐵) can be obtained when subnetwork 퐵
with 푛푖+1푓 is a fully connected network, 퐶퐵(퐵푚푖푛) = 푁퐵 − 1.
Although Equation (5.5) is not always easy to solve, from our numerical exper-
iment, we noted that max(푁퐵) ≤ 4 when we are using small size seed networks
푁 ≤ 15. Hence, we evaluated 퐶퐵(퐵) for all possible network topologies with
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Network Bnfi+1
Congestion Node
Figure 5.2: Subnetwork퐵 and congestion node 푛푖+1푓 .
size 0 ≤ 푁 ≤ max(푁퐵) and created a database (lookup table) for all possible
subnetworks topologies. The catastrophic network generator can query this table
and eﬃciently evaluate the contribution of 퐶퐵(퐵) to 퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ). The detail of this
lookup table is described below.
5.3.1 Graph Enumeration
To build the lookup table including all possible subnetworks 퐵 and sort them in
an order easy for query, we need to consider the graph enumeration calculation.
When constructing this table we focus on all possible subnetworks with 0 to 4
nodes. This is similar to graph enumeration in graph theory [7; 50]. Suppose a
graph 퐺 consists of a ﬁnite non-empty set of nodes 푁 , together with a speciﬁc set
of unordered pairs of distinct links where there are no loops and multiple links. In
this case, a network of four nodes will have eleven possible unlabeled topologies,
as illustrated in Figure 5.3. As the number of nodes in the network grows, the
possible unlabeled topologies increase rapidly, see table 5.1 below [7]. We ﬁnd
out that look up table for larger size subnetwork is really hard to generate and
further optimization on graph numeration program is needed.
Furthermore, we also need to label the network topologies for subnetwork
퐵. This is because in a labeled network, each node is distinctive. By placing
the congestion node 푛푖+1푓 at diﬀerent position in the same network topology, the
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Number of Nodes 4 5 6 7 8
Number of Possible Networks 11 34 156 1044 12346
Table 5.1: Possible number of unlabeled networks
Figure 5.3: Eleven diﬀerent topologies of network with four nodes.
Figure 5.4: Six diﬀerent labeling of a graph with four nodes and ﬁve links [7].
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퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ) will be diﬀerent. For example in Figure 5.4, there are six diﬀerent
ways to label a graph with four nodes and ﬁve links. In other words, for a
combination of four nodes and ﬁve links one can build six diﬀerent networks. At
each catastrophic network growing step, we are more interested in the subnetwork
퐵’s betweenness centrality contribution to 푛푖+1푓 . Network topologies with 4 nodes
might have a higher contribution to the betweenness centrality of 푛푖푓 , i.e. the
star–shape topology, while some network topologies have little contribution to
the 퐶퐵(푛
푖
푓 ), i.e. a fully connected graph. So we sorted network topologies ﬁrst by
their size (number of nodes) and then by their betweenness centrality contribution
to 푛푖푓 . When a certain betweenness centrality is needed during the catastrophic
network growing process, potential subnetworks at the same size with the equal
betweenness centrality contribution to 푛푖푓 are selected randomly from the topology
table. The random selection of equal betweenness contribution topologies makes
sure that we do not end up with the same topology for diﬀerent growing processes.
In Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7, we show all possible topologies of the subnetwork 퐵
with 푛푖푓 by arranging them with diﬀerent size and number of links in the network,




Figure 5.5: Network B with 1, 2 and 3 nodes.
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Figure 5.6: Network B with 4 nodes and 4 to 6 links.
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Figure 5.7: Network B with 4 nodes and 7 to 10 links.
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Figure 5.8: Subnetwork퐴 and congestion node 푛푖+1푓 .
In this section we are going to examine how the connection between subnet-
work 퐴 and 푛푖+1푓 would aﬀect 퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ), see Figure 5.8. Suppose that sub-network
퐵 is not connected to 푛푖+1푓 . This means that 퐶퐵(퐵) = 0 and 푁퐵 = 0 in this case.
The betweenness centrality of 푛푖+1푓 can be rewritten as
퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ) = 퐶퐵(퐴) +푁퐴, (5.6)
leaving 퐶퐵(퐴) the only variable. The only way to modify 퐶퐵(퐴) is to add and
delete links between congestion node 푛푖푓 and subnetwork 퐴. Suppose there are
two nodes 푛퐴(푠) and 푛퐴(푑) in subnetwork 퐴, there is no direct link between them,
but they are both connected to 푛푖푓 . Thus the shortest paths between them have
to include the path “푛퐴(푠)− 푛푖+1푓 − 푛퐴(푑)”. So that 푛푖푓 is on one of the shortest-
paths between these two nodes. Suppose to the extreme condition, all nodes in
subnetwork 퐴 have a link connecting to congestion node 푛푖+1푓 . Then for the node
pairs in 퐴 that are not directly connected, one of their shortest paths should go
pass 푛푖+1푓 . Then we can obtain 퐶퐵(퐴)푚푎푥. Notice that in this extreme situation,
removing connections between subnetwork 퐴 and 푛푖+1푓 could only decrease the
value of 퐶퐵(퐴). When there is only one link between subnetwork 퐴 and 푛
푖+1
푓 ,
we can have 퐶퐵(퐴)푚푖푛. Because we are targeting 푛
푖+1
푓 as the node with highest
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betweenness in the network, it is reasonable to initially connect all subnetwork 퐴
nodes to 푛푖+1푓 then remove the links to ﬁnd the solutions. In this way, we will
get the right connection between 퐴 and 푛푖+1푓 plus 퐵 that meets the growing
requirement faster.
5.5 Branch and Bound Method: Conditions
Building catastrophic networks using the “branch and bound” method, we also
need to meet two requirements set in the previous chapter.
1. The traﬃc production rate for new node 푛푖+1푓 to congest should be higher
than but close to that for previous step node 푛푖푓 . It is Λ
∗
푖+1−Λ∗푖 ≥ 휖, where
휖→ 0.
2. Furthermore the congestion node 푛푖+1푓 should be the ﬁrst node to congest in
the catastrophic network. It means 푛푖+1푓 should have the small congestion
(critical) load in the catastrophic network of this step. So 푛푖+1푓 ’s congestion




From last section we can estimate the betweenness centrality of nodes in sub-
network 퐵 using the lookup table built. But the betweenness centrality of nodes
in subnetwork 퐴 is hard to calculate and depends on the connectivities of the
whole network. To meet the requirements, how can we compare the betweenness
centrality value of 푛푖+1푓 to all other nodes quickly without running the time and
computer resource consuming betweenness centrality calculation program?
From observation and investigation, the topological structure of subnetwork 퐵
would not aﬀect the shortest-paths from 푛푖+1푓 to nodes in network 퐴, because 푛
푖+1
푓
acts as a bridge between subnetwork 퐴 and 퐵. Here we try to work out fast way
to calculate the betweenness centrality of nodes in 퐴.
∙ In subnetwork 퐴, the betweenness centralities of nodes are 퐶퐵(퐴0푖 ), where
푖 = 1..., 푁퐴.
∙ By connecting 푛푖+1푓 to 퐴 with links, the betweenness centralities of nodes




5.6 Branch and Bound Method: Branch Search Algorithm
∙ Suppose there is only one node 퐵0 in subnetwork 퐵 and it is connected to
푛푖+1푓 through one link. The shortest path between 퐵0 and 퐴푖 must pass
through 푛푖+1푓 . If there is 푥 shortest paths from 푛
푖+1
푓 to 퐴0, then there will
be 푥 shortest paths from 퐵0 to 퐴0.
From numerical experiments we found out that the addition of nodes and con-
nections in subnetwork 퐵 increases the betweenness centrality of nodes 퐶퐵(퐴푖)
in subnetwork 퐴 linearly as
퐶퐵(퐴
1
푖 ) = 퐶퐵(퐴
0
푖 ) + 훼푖푁퐵, (5.7)
where 훼 is the linear increase rate. This linear increase rate 훼 could be calcu-
lated numerically and dynamically during each step of the catastrophic network
growing process. Consider there is only one node in subnetwork 퐵 (푁퐵 = 1), 훼
can be calculated as:
훼푖 = 퐶퐵(퐴
1
푖 )− 퐶퐵(퐴0푖 ). (5.8)
Hence 훼 can be obtained at the very beginning of each growing step when 푛푖+1푓
is added and linked to subnetwork 퐴. Then 퐶퐵(퐴푖) can be calculated eﬃciently
when the topology of subnetwork 퐵 is changed.
5.6 Branch and Bound Method: Branch Search
Algorithm
Recall Equation (5.3), we want to minimize the value of 휖. So we need to evaluate
how the diﬀerent connections between subnetwork 퐴, subnetwork 퐵 and 푛푖+1푓
would contribute to 퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ). If the nodes in 퐴 are labeled as 푛1, 푛2, ...푛푖, the
links of these nodes with 푛푖+1푓 can be expressed as a binary sequence
퐿 = {푙1, . . . , 푙푁퐴} = {0, 1, . . . , }, (5.9)
where 푙푖 = 1 if node 푛푖 in 퐴 is connected with 푛
푖+1
푓 , otherwise 푙푖 = 0. Note that
the number of diﬀerent binary sequence combinations grows exponentially at 2푁퐴 ,
which is another major challenge for building very large catastrophic network.
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1111
0111 1011 1101 1110
0011 0101 1001 0110 1010 1100
0001 0010 0100 1000
0000
Figure 5.9: Solution space represented as a tree for the case when the network 퐴
has four nodes
To search which of the binary sequences with a subnetwork 퐵 can better min-
imize 휖, we use a branch and bound algorithm based on the following observation.
If all the nodes in 퐴 are directly connected to 푛푖+1푓 , then for any pair of nodes
in 퐴 which are not directly connected, there will be at least one shortest path
between these two nodes that passes through 푛푖+1푓 . The length of this path is 2
hops. From last section, this connectivity between 퐴 and 푛푖+1푓 gives the maximum
possible value of 퐶퐵(퐴). Removing any link between 퐴 and 푛
푖+1
푓 will reduce only
퐶퐵(퐴). To use this property in the search for the minimal 휖, the binary sequence
퐿 is employed to organise the space of solutions as a rooted tree. The root cor-
responds to the solution where all nodes of 퐴 are linked to 푛푖+1푓 . The branches
of the tree are explored by removing connections between 퐴 and 푛푖+1푓 , where the
corresponding 푙푖 is set to 0. Figure 5.9 shows an example of the solution space
tree for 푁퐴 = 4 with 16 possible connections. The branch and bound algorithm
to solve one step of the inverse cascade is given below.
Algorithm: Inverse–Cascade
1: Start with the case that all the nodes in 퐴 are connected to 푛푖+1푓 (i.e. 퐶퐵(퐴)
is maximum and {푙푖, . . . , 푙푁퐴} = {1, . . . , 1}.
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2: Evaluate 퐶퐵(퐴), initialize 푘 = 1, 푗 = 1
3: Disconnect 푛푘 from 푛
푖+1
푓 , i.e. 푙푘 = 0
4: for all sub–networks 퐵 of size ≤ max(푁퐵) do
5: evaluate min(휖) using Equations (5.3) and (5.4)
6: end for
7: if min(휖) ≥ 0 then
8: if min(휖) ≈ 0 then
9: stop, solution found
10: end if
11: Search Branches: remove link 푙푗 where 푗 < 푘
12: 푗 ← 푗 + 1
13: goto step 3 unless there are no more branches to select
14: else
15: Cut Branches: Deleting links between network 퐴 and 푛푖+1푓 will only
decrease 퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ). So sub-branches under this branch will not produce
high enough values of 퐶퐵(푛
푖+1
푓 ), which is not necessary to investigate.
16: Connect 푛푖 back to node 푛
푖+1
푓 .
17: 푘 ← 푘 + 1 return to step 2 unless there are no more links to select i.e.
푘 = 푁퐴 then stop
18: end if
The output of the algorithm is the sequence 퐿 and connectivity of the sub–
network 퐵. The algorithm is also shown as ﬂow chart in Figure 5.10. This
algorithm is similar with the Depth First Search in graph theory using the recur-
sive function calls. But it has advantage that it will consider a escape condition
during the search. We ﬁnd out that by setting the last bit of the binary list to
be ‘0’ makes the binary number to be an even number and ‘1’ makes it an odd
number. Furthermore, within the set of numbers of 푁퐴 bits, half of them are
even numbers while the other half are odd numbers. By looking at the binary
solution tree again, half of the tree that is going to be searched is down in the
branch “11...10” with all even numbers. And the odd numbers are in the rest
branches with “xx...x1” and the root of the tree “11...1”. We have made a fur-
ther improvement on the branch and bound algorithm by diverting the search
to begin with the odd numbers of the tree structure. Rather than go down the
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Figure 5.10: Flow chart for the algorithm of the branch and bound method.
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even number branch, the searching on the odd branches are much faster to get
topologies that meet the requirements set. But also notice that the searches begin
with the odd branches will sometimes come up diﬀerent topology solutions with
those starting in the even branch. Finally, we also implement the code to search
hopping between the branches, in order to shorten the time needed to come up
with the right topology. Although it only shows slight improvement on search
time.
5.7 Results and Analysis
Figure 5.11: Seed network chosen are the one star and two stars shape network.
Two seed networks are used to build the catastrophic network with the im-
proved “branch and bound” method proposed in this chapter, as illustrated in
Figure 5.11. We focus on the catastrophic network generated using the six node
star-shape network ﬁrst. The growing steps of this network have been shown
previously in Figure 5.12.
Starting with the seed network (Figure 5.12(a)), the “branch and bound”
method added the congest node 푛푖푓 and subnetwork 퐵 with their connections.
Figure 5.12(b) is the third step of the growing with 14 nodes. But at the 11th
step and 16th step, the catastrophic networks become very diﬀerent from the
ones generated using the random growing method in Chapter 4. The catastrophic
networks generated using branch and bound method have more links. We can
identify two layers of nodes when they are plotted in Figure 5.12(c) and (d).
There seems to be a core subnetwork in the middle of the network with more
connections than the rest of nodes in the network.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5.12: (a) is the seed network to start the growth of catastrophic network.
(b), (c) and (d) are the catastrophic networks at the third step of the growth
with 14 nodes, 11th step with 31 nodes and 16th step with 41 nodes.
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To further investigate the property of this family of catastrophic networks, we
again examined the betweenness centrality of 푛푖푓 for each growing step for the 41
node catastrophic network. Strictly following the conditions set by the “branch
and bound” method, the congestion traﬃc generation rates at each growing step
are very close to each other, where we control 휖 ≤ 0.001. So the betweenness
centralities of congested node 푛푖푓 of each growing step follow the upper boundary
closely, such that Λ푛푖+1푓
≥ Λ푛푖푓 is satisﬁed. We do not plot the 퐶퐵(푛푖푓 ) of each step
again here because it almost overlaps with the upper bound. This gives us a way
to construct a network that the traﬃc generation rate to congest the network at
every step of the cascade is almost the same.
As mentioned, by looking at the plotting of this type of catastrophic networks,
one can see the special structural features. Figure 5.13 shows the node degree
distribution and the cumulative degree distribution of two catastrophic networks
built using branch and bound method. The degree distribution shows that there
are a large portion of nodes with degree 15 and 16 and the number of nodes with
other degrees are almost the same. It is diﬀerent from the networks built using
the random growing method whose degree distribution are similar to random
networks. Considering the cumulative degree distribution, they are also diﬀerent
from those of catastrophic network built using random growing method. Hence
we take a closer look at these properties.
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Figure 5.13: Degree distribution and cumulative degree distribution of 41-node
catastrophic network (catastrophic network 1: generated using star shape seed
network) and 55-node catastrophic network (catastrophic network 2: generated
using two-stars shape seed network).
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5.7.1 Comparison with Random and Scale-free Networks
The catastrophic networks generated using the “branch and bound” method in-
troduced a special structural feature during the growing process. To ﬁnd out the
characteristics of this special family of catastrophic networks, we choose two of
these networks: a 41 node network built using a 6 node star-shape seed network
and a 55 node network built using a 10 node two-stars shape seed network. Then
we generate ER random networks and BA scale-free networks using our topol-
ogy generator with the same number of nodes, see Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15.
By looking at the plot, this type of catastrophic network is neither similar to a
random network nor a scale-free network. Instead, they show two types of nodes:
∙ Highly connected nodes that positioned in the center cluster of the network
in Figure 5.14(a) and Figure 5.15(a).
∙ Relatively poorly connected nodes positioned in the outer layer in the ﬁg-
ures.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 5.14: (a) 41-node catastrophic network generated using star shape seed
network, (b) 41-node ER random network and (c) 41-node BA scale-free network.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 5.15: (a) 55-node catastrophic network generated using two-star shape
seed network, (b) 55-node ER random network and (c) 55-node BA scale-free
network.
120
5.7 Results and Analysis
We then analyse the topological properties of these networks and compare
them in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. These networks have 41 nodes in Table 5.2
and 55 nodes in Table 5.3. This type of catastrophic networks still has similar
number of links, average degree, and average shortest path length with random
networks. Besides their diﬀerence in maximum betweenness centrality value,
they also have very diﬀerent maximum node degree. This type of catastrophic
network even has higher maximum node degree than scale-free network, but still
don’t have the same level of maximum betweenness centrality value. Furthermore,
the catastrophic networks have almost three times the number of links, average
degree and two times the maximum degree to those of the scale-free networks.
Network Type 푁 퐿 푘¯ 푘푚푎푥 퐶퐵(푚푎푥) ℓ¯
Catastrophic Network 41 395 9.6 38 200 1.5
Random Network 41 362 8.8 25 90 1.6
Scale-free Network 41 130 3.1 22 370 2.0
Table 5.2: Compare 41-node Networks’ Properties
Network Type 푁 퐿 푘 푘푚푎푥 퐶퐵(푚푎푥) ℓ¯
Catastrophic Network 55 559 10.2 52 412 1.6
Random Network 55 542 9.9 28 136 1.6
Scale-free Network 55 183 3.3 22 497 2.2
Table 5.3: Compare 55-node Networks’ Properties
Figures 5.16 and 5.17 show the node degree distribution and the betweenness
centrality of nodes against their sequence number when they were added to net-
work. Again we could see the degree distributions of catastrophic networks have
a signiﬁcant peak which is diﬀerent from both random and scale-free networks.
The betweenness centrality of the catastrophic networks show a special feature:
there is a group of nodes with the same betweenness centrality level and another
group of nodes with betweenness centrality increase rapidly with the node se-
quence number. It matches what we see from the plots of this type of network
with two types of nodes. We investigate this special feature in the next section.
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But it is important to point out here that we are investigating this speciﬁc family
of catastrophic networks and compare its topological properties with random and
scale-free networks. Although these networks have diﬀerent properties as random
and scale-free networks, there may be random and scale-free networks that would
































































































































Figure 5.16: (a) Compare the degree distribution of 41-node catastrophic net-
work (left) generated from star shape seed network with same size random net-
work (middle) and BA scale-free network (right). (b) Compare the networks’
betweenness centrality of 41-node catastrophic network (left) with same size ran-
dom network (middle) and BA scale-free network (right).
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Figure 5.17: (a) Compare the degree distribution of 55-node catastrophic network
(left) generated from two-star seed network with same size random network (mid-
dle) and BA scale-free network (right). (b) Compare the networks’ betweenness
centrality of 55-node catastrophic network (left) with same size random network




5.8.1 Seed Network Constraint
From Chapter 4, we have Λ∗ ≥ 휇푤(푁−1)
퐶퐵(푤)
, the connectivity of the seed network
deﬁnes the traﬃc production rate Λ∗0 when congestion happens in it. When
building the catastrophic networks, the target is to construct a network that at
each step of the avalanche, the new congestion load changes as little as possible.
That is Λ푛푖+1푓
≥ Λ푛푖푓 ≥ ...Λ∗0. However there is not always a solution. When
building the catastrophic networks, it is possible that the congestion only occurs
at loads larger than Λ∗0. This opens the question if it is possible to build a
catastrophic network at any given Λ∗. Figure 5.18 shows the change of Λ∗ as
the catastrophic network is built from a four-node and a ﬁve-node star-shape
seed network. For the four-node star-shape network, the initial congestion load is
Λ∗0 = 0.25. The ﬁgure shows that to sustain the avalanche as the network grows,
the congestion load has to be increased. However for the ﬁve-node star-shape
seed network with Λ∗0 = 0.2, a catastrophic network can be constructed that the
catastrophic network at each step fails at the same congestion load.
In general, we noticed that if the congestion load of the seed network is rel-
atively “high”, i.e. 휆∗ ≥ 0.25, then the congestion load has to be increased to
build a catastrophic network.
5.8.1.1 Invariant
For those networks that fail at each step at the same load Λ∗, we observe that there
is a special family of catastrophic networks whose connections follow a pattern.
Figure 5.19 shows (a) the betweenness centrality and (b) the degree distribution
of a network at two diﬀerent steps of its growth. By construction the nodes are
split into two groups, the nodes that will congest and trigger the avalanche and
the rest of the nodes in the network. We noticed that this distinction between the
nodes is also reﬂected in the betweenness centrality and the degree distribution
of the nodes.
Figure (5.19) (b) shows that the degree 푘 of congestion (failure) and non-




























































































Figure 5.19: The betweenness centrality (a) and the degree (b) of the nodes of the
catastrophic network as the size of the network increases. The black dot represent
a smaller size catastrophic network with 29 nodes and the circle represent a bigger
size network with 41 nodes. And the normalisation of betweenness centralities
(c) and degree (d) independent of the network size.
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the node sequence number (the sequence the node is added to the network) and
the latter decreases. These two trends follow the lines
푘 = 훼± 훽푛, (5.10)
where 훼 and 훽 are constants here, 푛 is the number that labels the nodes (the se-
quence number). Using diﬀerent seed networks and checking this linear behaviour
at diﬀerent stages of the avalanche we obtained that
훼 ≈ 훾푛 (5.11)
and
훽 ≈ 0.5, (5.12)
where 훾 is a constant. In Figure 5.19(c) and (d) the data sets with catastrophic
networks at diﬀerent growing steps are re-scaled, in order to show how the be-
tweenness centrality and degree of the nodes follow an invariant as the network
grows. This observation hints that it is possible to construct very large catas-
trophic network by only specifying the degree and betweenness centrality. No-
tice that this result covers only one family of potential catastrophic networks.
It is possible to create a catastrophic network that it is not evident how the
failure/non-failure nodes are related to each other.
5.8.1.2 Asymptotic Problem
In Figure 5.19 (a)-(b), the nodes with the highest value of degree or centrality
correspond to the congestion nodes of each growing steps 푛푖푓 . We have also found
that the centrality of these nodes tends to increase with the network size as:
퐶퐵(푛
푖
푓 ) ≈ exp(푛푖푓/퐴(푁)) + 퐶퐵(푚푖푛), (5.13)
where 푁 is the number of nodes in the network, 퐴(푁) is an increasing function
of 푁 and 퐶퐵(푚푖푛) = 푁 − 1 which is the minimum betweenness that a node can
have (see Figure 5.19(c)). From these constructed catastrophic networks , we are
not able to determine if 퐴(푁) tends to be a constant or grows linearly as the size
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if the betweenness grows exponentially, then
휆(푛푖푓 ) = Λ
exp(푛푖푓/퐴(푁)) +푁 − 1
푁 − 1 ≥ 휇(푛
푖
푓 ). (5.14)
If 퐴(푁) tends to a constant for large 푁 , then the arrival rate at a node is
휆(푛푖푓 )→∞. (5.15)
It implies that after a certain size the networks will fail catastrophically. If 퐴(푁)
grows linearly with 푁 ,
퐴(푁) ≈ 푎+ 푏푁 (5.16)
then
휆(푛푖푓 )→ Λ ≥ 휇(푛푖푓 ), (5.17)
as 푁 →∞ If 휇(푛푖푓 ) = 1, then the catastrophe will occur if Λ = 1 and the network
is fully connected. If 휇(푛푖푓 ) ≥ 1 it is still an open question if catastrophic networks
exist for very large 푁 .
5.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduce a new approach to study the problem of cascade
failure in networks. Instead of taking a given network and test if and how it will
fail catastrophically, the catastrophic networks are constructed.
We ﬁrst re-consider the network segmentation and study the betweenness
centrality contributions to the congestion node 푛푖푓 . This gives us the opportunity
to ﬁnd bounds for the solution space and eliminate unwanted network topologies.
The ﬁrst bound is the maximum number of node of subnetwork 퐵, where a lookup
table of all possible networks with diﬀerent betweenness centrality contribution
to 푛푖푓 is sorted and built. The other bound for connection between subnetwork 퐴
and congestion node 푛푖푓 and the conditions introduced inspire the creation of the
“branch and bound” method.
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Analysis of the catastrophic networks generated using this method shows that
they are neither random nor scale-free, but with their own properties. The con-
gestion nodes that are designed to fail at each growing step have diﬀerent degree
and betweenness centrality value from other nodes in the network. The results
also show that we have control over the critical load that produces the cascade
as well as the number of steps that the cascade has. The invariant discussed
also indicates these networks can be very large and have a predetermined de-
gree distribution. We believed that extending this approach will provide further





While we are celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the Internet, the computer
network has evolved into a complex system. This makes its analysis more chal-
lenging. Analytical techniques (e.g., the queueing theory) are adequate for small
scale networks. But the increasing deployment of network hardware devices and
diﬀerent protocols have made network simulation one of the tools to analyse
realistic scenarios of modern network operations [123].
Simulation is the technique of using computers to imitate the operations of
various kinds of real-world facilities or processes [124]. Therefore, network sim-
ulation is the technique where the software models the behavior of a network
either by calculating the interaction between the diﬀerent network entities using
mathematical formulas, or actually capturing and playing back observations from
a operating network.
There are more reasons why we use network simulation. Real networks are
diﬃcult to instantiate (purchase, install, and conﬁgure) in order to experiment
with scenarios, especially for large network conﬁgurations. Moreover, it is hard to
create desired network conditions in real networks for controlled experimentation.
For example, network with speciﬁc traﬃc loads and congestion patterns. Besides,
network simulation is also used to test early prototypes of new network technolo-
gies or duplicate existing networks for analysis. Because of this, in this chapter
we use network simulations to study catastrophic networks in a controllable and
repeatable environment. We want to verify that the catastrophic network topolo-
gies obtained based on the assumption that traﬃc ﬂows are approximated using
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betweenness centrality.
To begin with, we brieﬂy introduce the network simulation model and simula-
tion tools available. The open-source network simulator OMNet++ is used as the
network simulation platform with basic network scenarios. Finally, we analyse
the results from network simulations using OMNet++ to see if a catastrophic
network built using the assumptions of previous chapters do reﬂect the failures
on a simulated network.
6.1 Network Simulation Model
Network simulation can be model as a Discrete-event simulation which is the
basis of many existing network simulators [125; 126]. Discrete-event simulation
concerns the state variables change instantaneously at separate points in time.
These points in time are the ones at which an event occurs which would change
the state or variables of the network system. Because of the dynamic nature of
discrete-event simulation, one have to keep track of the simulation time as the
simulation proceeds.
A mechanism to advance the simulation clock is also needed and it is the
timing system of the network simulation. The next-event time advance method
is utilized by most of the major simulation software. The ﬂow chart of the next-
event advance method is shown in Figure 6.1. Firstly, the start of the simulation
would go into the main program to invoke the initialization routine to set up the
simulation environment. The main program would invoke the timing routine to
determine the next event and transfer control to the corresponding event routine
to update system state appropriately. It also checks the termination of the sim-
ulation and invokes the report generator to build up the needed information as
results. The event routine updates the system state when a particular type of
event occurs. It would invoke the random number generator if it needs one.
Most network simulators provide graphical user interface where users can con-
ﬁgure the simulation inputs easily. They can provide tools to visualize simulated
network and simulated events 1. But there are still some simulators that require
1Network visualization is introduced in Appendix B
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Figure 6.1: Next Event Flow Chart
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their users to provide formatted input scripts or commands. These are the net-
work parameters employed to show the state of the network (node and links) and
the events (data traﬃc generation, node or link failures, etc). On the other hand,
the important output of network simulations are the trace ﬁles. Trace ﬁles can
document every event that occurred in the simulation and are used for analysis.
Users could conﬁgure the simulator to output speciﬁc data from the simulation
according to their interest. Certain simulators have added functionality of cap-
turing this type of data directly and processing the raw data. But most of the
time, extra software is needed to sort and analyse trace ﬁles.
For further details about network simulation modeling and analysis, please
refer to book [124] and [123].
6.1.1 Network Topology Generation
The network topologies used for network simulations are either copy of the real
network or generated using a topology generator. The existing network topology
generators can be used to construct small size network of less than a hundred
nodes to large networks with a million nodes. It is vital to set up the precise
network topology to model diﬀerent scenarios according to the purpose of the
simulation. There are many topology generators available freely for academic re-
search. A brief introduction and comparison of these topology generators can be
found in Appendix B. However in our simulations, to verify the catastrophic net-
works generated, we use the small scale catastrophic network topology obtained
in previous chapters.
6.1.2 Network Traﬃc Generation
The discovery of Self-similar Long Range Dependence traﬃc [27] in the Inter-
net changed people’s view on the traditional “Poisson-like” traﬃc to simulate
packet network. The Internet traﬃc show more burstiness across wide time scale
than what is obtains using Poisson models. Most network simulators have both





In computer networking the term routing generally refers to selecting the best
paths in a the network along which to send packets and the exchange of routing
information between individual routers. The algorithms to choose the routes,
the data structures used, and the way routers exchange routing information are
a major concern in network simulation. The forwarding process handles each
packet as it arrives, looking up the outgoing link to use for it in the routing
tables. The other process is responsible for ﬁlling in and updating the routing
tables due to time or topology change. Simulators normally include very basic
routing support such as pass on the packets according to the global shortest path
calculation. This is not implementing a existing real routing protocol. It simply
passes on packets through shortest paths and ignoring the exchange of routing
information (global routing). Some sophisticated simulator would include open
standard routing protocols, such as Routing Information Protocol (RIP) and
Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) routing protocol both available free from the
“Internet Engineering Task Force” (IETF) [74; 77; 78].
6.2 Simulation Tools
A number of network simulators, both commercial and open source have been
developed and widely used. Well known commercial simulators includes OPNET,
Shunra, QualNet, and NetSim. On the other hand in public domain, simulators
includes NS2, NS3, and OMNeT++ are utilized for academic researches and
educational studies where they support the simulation of IP, TCP, routing, and
multicast protocols over wired and wireless networks.
The NS2, NS3 and PDNS [125] are popular tools for simulating networks.
While the update, documentation, and support of NS2 is limited due to the on-
going development of NS3 which is intended as an eventual replacement for the
NS2. They are now not suitable for simulations for our research. The other popu-
lar and free network simulation platform is OMNeT++ [126]. It is a public-source,
component-based, modular and open-architecture simulation environment with
strong Graphical User Interface support and an embeddable simulation kernel. Its
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primary application area is the simulation of communication networks. Although
OMNeT++ is not a network simulator itself, it is currently gaining widespread
popularity as a network simulation platform in the scientiﬁc community as well
as in industrial settings, and building up a large user community. Because of its
complicated and detailed support for diﬀerent network protocols, the size of the
simulated network is constrained by the amount of computer resources available.
We decided to use OMNeT++ as our network simulation platform with its
communication network simulation packages. It is because it supports a simple
simulation kernel library written in C++ which is easy to modify to suit diﬀerent
simulations. OMNeT++’s IDE is based on the Eclipse platform with Graphical
User Interface for simulation execution and result analysis. It also has a large
amount of manual, tutorials, publications, and sample simulations that are very
useful for setting up our own simulations. Furthermore, it could be installed and
run on diﬀerent platforms including Linux, Mac OS X, other Unix-like systems
and on Windows (XP, Win2K, Vista, 7). This makes it very convenient to migrate
the simulations from development workstation to servers which could run the
simulations faster.
6.2.1 Validation and veriﬁcation
One of the most diﬃcult problems facing a simulation analyst is trying to de-
termine whether a simulation model is an accurate representation of the actual
system being studied. The main factors that must be considered in order to
ensure the credibility of simulation results is veriﬁcation and validation of simu-
lation model and the setup of valid simulation experiment [124]. Veriﬁcation is
concerned with determining whether the conceptual simulation model has been
correctly translated into a computer “program”. While validation is the process
of determining whether a simulation model is an accurate representation of the
system for the particular objectives of the study.
The following veriﬁcation and validation techniques were applied to the sim-
ulation models used in this research [124]:
∙ Applying C/C++ Debugging tools to codes in the simulation models.
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∙ Structured walk-through of the model and compare with real network de-
vices and protocols.
∙ Simpliﬁed test cases: using oﬃcial veriﬁcation TicToc tutorial from OM-
NeT++ [126], running the ARPTest simulation from INET framework
[127].
∙ Examine the event-log output which is a time-ordered list of events, i.e. a
packet entering and leaving a router.
∙ Continuity test: running the simulation with slightly diﬀerent values of
input parameters which should produce only slight changes in the output.
For example, increase the UDP traﬃc generation rate.
∙ Random number generator check: see if similar results are produced for
diﬀerent seed values in the random number generator. Note that OMNet++
has the Mersenne Twister RNG as default RNG.
∙ Output data analysis: the most deﬁnitive test of a simulation model’s va-
lidity is to establish that its output data closely resemble the output data
that would be expected from the actual system (see Figure 6.2). Again we
use both TicToc tutorial for OMNeT++ platform and ARPTest for INET
framework.
As a infrastructure to support network simulation, OMNet++ and its network
simulation package INET is one of the favorite simulation tools for academic
research and educational studies. More than four hundred related publications
could be obtained from its web site [128]. So OMNet++ and INET have also




Firstly, we build a simple network scenario to test congestion on networks when
it is under heavy traﬃc load. It is expected that over certain traﬃc load queues
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Figure 6.2: The validation of simulation model output data.
would begin to build up in the congestion routers. Increasing the traﬃc load will
make the queues bigger and eventually reaching the limit queue length when we
consider the router too busy to handle anymore incoming traﬃc.
6.3.1.1 Topology
The topology for the basic scenario is the star shape six node topology. It is one
of the seed network to grow the catastrophic network topology. So the network
in this basic scenario contains 6 routers with one router at the center of the star
connecting to other 5 routers.
The router model chosen from the INET framework has the ability to store
and forward data packets based on its building blocks: PPP (Point to Point
Protocol) interface, Ethernet interface, OSPF routing, routing table, Interface
table and network layer module [127]. Besides, we also have one network host
connecting to each router representing the source and sink of packets. Queues
in the routers are interface queues (buﬀers) with limited length like any real
router interfaces. The queue could be a drop-tail queue, drop-tail QoS queue
(classify packets based on their type of service (ToS) ﬁeld), or RED (Random
Early Discard) queue. In this scenario we use a simple drop-tail queue model in
both PPP and Ethernet interface. By default the PPP interface has a transmit
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Figure 6.3: The star shape six-node, nine-node and twelve-node small catas-
trophic network topology used for building simulation scenarios.
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queue limit of 1000 packets and MTU (Maximum transmission unit) of 4470
bytes. The Ethernet interface is used to connect the host to the router. And
they have a default data rate of 100Mps and MTU of 1500 bytes. In this case
the router can be seen as a hybrid router-switch, which provides layer 3 routing
and layer 2 Ethernet connections to hosts. We use only Ethernet interface on the
routers assuming that they are controlled by one ISP and close to each other that
Ethernet link is enough to support inter-router connection.
Hosts in the network are standard hosts supporting: TCP, UDP, TCP applica-
tion, UPP application, PPP interface, Ethernet Interface, interface table, routing
table, etc. But only the Ethernet interface is used to connect to the router.
6.3.1.2 Traﬃc
So packets are generated at each host and sent randomly to all other hosts in
the network. INET framework provided: basic UDP application (with constant
bit rate), basic TCP application, RTP application (streaming traﬃc), and also
IP layer traﬃc generator directly send and receive IP packets. TCP is a protocol
that forces competing users to share bandwidth and generally behave in ways
that are good for the productivity of the overall network. But a large amount
of TCP traﬃc, such as Bit-Torrent or sometimes web browsing, would congest
network routers. While UDP blasts packets out as fast as it can (i.e., online
games, music, voice and video streaming). So we made use of the TCP, UDP and
IP layer traﬃc generator. The examples shown later in this chapter have UDP
applications as traﬃc source.
6.3.1.3 Routing
The routing protocol chosen is OSPF, it is the only supported and sophisticated
interior gateway protocol in INET framework. We are not going to discuss the
detail implementation of OSPF in INET, for more information please refer to
INET documentation [127]. Packets are forwarded from the source host to the
routers and ﬁnally to the destination host. The router would use the OSPF’s
Dijkstra shortest-path algorithm to calculate its forwarding path to create the
routing table. Links between routers have the same weight.
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Each host would be assigned an IP address in separate Class C subnets (i.e.,
IP address: 192.168.1.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0). The routing metric for
the link between the host and the router is ’1’. And the default gateway for
the host is obviously its connected router. Each interface on the router would
be assigned with diﬀerent IP addresses (i.e., IP address: 192.168.60.64, subnet
mask: 255.255.255.254). But all these routers would be conﬁgured to be within
one OSPF area.
6.3.2 Catastrophic Network Scenario
The basic model is to test if congestion in the network would really build up
queues in the network under real TCP and UDP application. And whether the
center router of the star shape topology would fail to cope with the excessive
amount of load. Then we would like to test a very small catastrophic network
with nine nodes. This scenario is intended to test the cascade failure, where the
router designed to be heavily congested and becomes the ﬁrst to fail to cope with
the amount of traﬃc. As the topology changes, the routers and hosts in the
network would be the same as in the basic scenario. The hosts would use the
same application and traﬃc generator as the traﬃc source. The OSPF is also
used as the routing protocol with links having the same weight.
6.4 Catastrophic Network Simulation Results
In this section, we are going to look at the simulation results using the three
catastrophic topologies: 6 node star-shape seed network, 9 node catastrophic
network built using branch and bound method, and 12 node catastrophic network
using branch and bound method. Due to the limitation of the computer system
and simulation platform used for the simulations, there are several constraints
to the ﬁnal outcomes. First, the computer system used for simulation is Dell
Workstation with Intel Duo Core Xeon 5500 CPU and 6G DDR RAM. It limits
the size of the network we could simulate, because of the level of simulation
carried out. The OMNET++ and INET framework could simulate network from
Physical Layer up to the Application Layer level. Secondly, OMNET++ has a
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limitation on the size of the logging ﬁle of 2 Gbyte. This limits the simulation
time for each simulation depend on the traﬃc load used. The heavier the traﬃc
the more packets logged, hence the bigger the log ﬁle.
In the following subsections, we try to monitor the queue size of the routers
to examine how congested they are. And these queues are First In First Out
Drop Tail queues. Although there are other metrics for network congestion, such
as delay and throughput, we focus on the queue lengths. Because packets are
dropped when the router memory is full, the delay of the dropped packets tend
to be inﬁnity. The simulator only logs the delivered packets, making the delay
measurement not reﬂecting the real time congestion. Network throughput is
calculated by delivered packets in the period of time, but it would signiﬁcantly
slow down the simulation and further increase the log ﬁle.
6.4.1 Six-node Star-shape Topology
This scenario uses the six-node star-shape topology as the seed network to grow
the catastrophic networks, see Figure 6.3(a). Because of its unique shape, the
center node of the star topology carries the traﬃc between all the other nodes.
Hence, we expect to see longer queues in the center node although it is under
light and medium traﬃc load. It would also be the ﬁrst node in the topology to
be overloaded under heavy traﬃc condition.
The PCs (hosts) in this network all run four instances of the UDP application
which send out basic UDP traﬃc to all other PCs in the network by conﬁguration.
The UDP ports used are 1234, 1235, 1236 and 1237. The UDP applications send
out message every 0.1 second (low rate), 0.01 second (medium rate) and 0.001
second (hight rate) with message size of 6500 bytes. Every PC has its own routing
conﬁguration ﬁle. This ﬁle deﬁnes the PC’s IP address (i.e. 192.168.1.2), subnet
mask, MTU size, routing metric for OSPF (in this case it is 1), default gateway
and enables broadcast and multicast. On the other hand, the router has its own
routing conﬁguration ﬁle. It deﬁnes similar properties for each of the router’s
interfaces while the metric for the link between routers is manually set to 2.
Meanwhile, OMNET++ INET framework holds a global routing conﬁguration
ﬁle for OSPF to deﬁne the OSPF Area (just one Area in this case), address
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ranges, and OSPF router setup parameters. For more detail please see Appendix
A of the example for six-node star-shape topology.
Firstly, we test light traﬃc on the six-node star-shape catastrophic network.
The UDP application message length is 6500 bytes and sent every 0.1 unit sim-
ulation time, generating a data ﬂow of (6500 × 8)/0.1 = 520푘푏푖푡/푠. With four
UDP instances of applications running on a single host, the total amount of traf-
ﬁc from the host to the router is 2080푘푏푖푡/푠 or 2.08푀푏푖푡/푠. Secondly, medium
traﬃc is applied, with UDP application message length of 6500 bytes and sent
every 0.003 unit simulation time. The data rate of one UDP application is
6500푥8/0.003 = 17.3푀푏푖푡/푠, making the total data ﬂow from host to the route
69.3푀푏푖푡/푠. Finally, very heavy traﬃc is applied with UDP application message
length with 6500 bytes and sent every 0.001 unit simulation time. The data rate
of one UDP application is 6500푥8/0.001 = 52푀푏푖푡/푠, making the total data ﬂow
from host to the route 208푀푏푖푡/푠. Finally, we are not trying to simulate the
situation that the network goes from free-ﬂow state to congestion. Because it
would take the network very long time to converge and ﬁnally congested.
When applying a low data traﬃc rate from the host’s UDP application and
sending packets evenly to all other hosts in the network, a free-ﬂow state is
expected for the whole network. Figure 6.4(a) shows the queue in the Ethernet
Interface(0) of Host 3 in the network. Host 3 is directly connected to Router 3
and uses it as its default gateway to reach other networks. The queue size stays
constant at three. It indicates that most of the packets are sent with a minor
delay. On the other hand, there is no queue on Router 4 Ethernet Interface(0)
which is connecting to Host 4. It indicates that the router can handle the incoming
packets quickly and pass on to the outgoing interface. Figure 6.4(b) shows the
queue in Ethernet Interface(1) of Router 4 which is connected to Router 1. This
interface has a queue that ﬂuctuates through out the the 1000 unit simulation
time. But we could see that the queue size just occasionally grows to three and
two, while most of the time it stays at one. In short, Router 4 is shown to handle
the packets from the host and transfer them to the next hop router Router 1. The
queue length in Ethernet Interface(1) depends more on the condition of Router 1.
Because of the special structure of the star-shape topology, Router 1 has six
Ethernet interfaces connecting to all other routers and Host 1. So it carries all the
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.4: 6-node star-shape catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at
low load. (a) Ethernet Interface(0) Host 3, (b) Ethernet Interface(1) Router 4.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.5: 6-node star-shape catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at
low load. (a) Ethernet Interface(0) Router 1, (b) Ethernet Interface(5) Router 1.
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traﬃc ﬂow from host to host and experiences a higher load than other routers.
Figure 6.5(a) shows that the change of queue length on Ethernet Interface(0)
Router 1 is very diﬀerent, which is connecting to Host 1. While other routers
have no queues on this interface, Router 1’s queue on Interface(0) has an average
of four packets and peaks at 10 packets. In Figure 6.5(b), queue on another
Router 1 interface has a similar pattern. It is Ethernet Interface(5) of Router 1
connecting to Router 6. The reason for these patterns is the combination of all
the packets queued in Router 1 which take time to be processed. This indicates
that even at relatively low traﬃc generation rate, Router 1 carries more traﬃc
than other routers in the network. Thus Router 1 has the opportunity to get
congestion ﬁrst and even fail to route packets in the six-node star-shape network
topology.
As the network traﬃc generation rate is increase to a medium level, queues
on the hosts increase as expected. Figure 6.6(a) illustrated the queue in Ethernet
Interface(0) of Host 2 with a average length of 19 packets. The same increase
of the queue lengths could also be found on the queues of Router 3 Interface(1),
as shown in Figure 6.6(b). But more signiﬁcant increase of queue size could be
found on all Router 1 interfaces, Figure 6.7(a) and (b). The queue sizes ﬂuctuate
between 15 and 30 packets and once shoot up to 70 packets. Adding up all the
packets queued in Router 1 of the six interfaces at this traﬃc rate, Router 1 is
seen as heading towards congestion.
Finally, very high traﬃc generation rate is applied on the UDP application,
which is generating data stream is very large. It brings excessive packets to
all routers’ Ethernet interfaces pushing all the routers to their capacity limits.
Queue on Host 1 shows that host queues are almost always hitting the maximum
queue length of 1000 packets with occasional drops, Figure 6.8. Queues are
built up for both Interfaces(0) and Interface(1) of Router 3. It is diﬀerent from
the ones seen at low and medium traﬃc rate with no queues on the interface
connecting to the hosts. In Figure 6.9(a), queue in Ethernet Interface(0) at ﬁrst
grows and experience ﬂuctuation in ﬁrst 20 simulation time, then drop down to
zero as illustrated. But queue in the interface(1), shown in Figure 6.9(b), the
queue builds up and reaches the buﬀer limit and enters huge ﬂuctuation period
after simulation time 15. It is interesting to note that the queues on Router 1
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.6: 6-node star-shape catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at
medium load. (a) Ethernet Interface(0) Host 2, (b) Ethernet Interface(1) Router
3.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.7: 6-node star-shape catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc
at medium load. (a) Ethernet Interface(0) Router 1, (b) Ethernet Interface(4)
Router 1.
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Figure 6.8: 6-node star-shape catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at
high load. Ethernet Interface(0) Host 1.
shown Figure 6.10(a) and (b), shoot up from simulation time 7 right after the
queues built up on interface(0) of other routers. It shows that Router 1 enters the
extreme congested period before other routers do. This proves our assumption of
using betweenness centrality as an approximation of the network load.
In Figure 6.10(a) and (b), queues on Router 1 experience a dramatic growth up
to the buﬀer limit and down to zero. Under very high traﬃc load, all the routers
are forced to reach their maximum performance capacity. But rather than seeing
the queue lengths staying at their limit, huge increases and drops are experienced.
There are several reasons behind this. Traﬃc generated is larger than the link
could carry and routers just drop packets that could not be sent. Secondly, when
queues are full, these FIFO drop-tail queues also start to drop packets that could
not be stored. The busy link and full queues will drop data packets as well as the
routing information packets (OSPF hellos). This would aﬀect the routing update
which would make routers declare their neighbors to be unavailable or dead. The
route used to sent packets might be dropped from the routing table. Hence,
packets in the queues are discard because of unreachable destination. But when
the link is free and queue is cleared, the neighbor relationship establishes again
with the route added back to routing table. Thus all these cause the signiﬁcant
ﬂuctuations in queue length.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.9: 6-node star-shape catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at
high load. (a) Ethernet Interface(0) Router 3, (b) Ethernet Interface(1) Router 3.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.10: 6-node star-shape catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at
high load. (a) Ethernet Interface(3) Router 1, (b) Ethernet Interface(5) Router 1.
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6.4.2 Nine-node Catastrophic Network Topology
We examined the six-node star-shape topology in the last subsection, which is
also the seed network to grow the catastrophic network. It is important to fur-
ther analyse the catastrophic networks built based on it. In this subsection,
we investigate the behavior of the queues in the nine-node catastrophic network
topology under diﬀerent traﬃc levels. Similar to the one done in the previously,
low, medium and high traﬃc is applied to the hosts’ UDP application traﬃc gen-
erator. The UDP message size is still 6500Byte and sent every 0.1 second (low),
0.01 second (medium), and 0.001 second (high). The corresponding data ﬂow
sizes are 2.08Mbps, 20.8Mbps, and 208Mbps.
At the low traﬃc level, queues behave similarly as seen in the six-node topol-
ogy and we are not showing the graphs again. But there are more traﬃc sources
in the network, because more routers and hosts are added to the topology. The
total amount of the traﬃc in the network has increased accordingly. It is ex-
pected that the queues on the routers will be longer than the ones of the six-node
network, as can be seen from Figure 6.11(a) and (b). Also notice that Router 7
is the new router that is designed to congest ﬁrst in this topology. Queues on
it are built up faster and longer than those in the other routers, shown in Fig-
ure 6.12(a) and (b). Similar behaviour to the six node star-shape topology could
also be found when this network experiences medium traﬃc load, as illustrated
in Figure 6.13(a), (b), Figure 6.14(a) and (b).
At very high traﬃc generation level, the queues behave diﬀerently. The queue
on Ethernet interface(5) of Router 1 connecting to Router 6 is not as busy as
it is in the six-node star-shape network. Because it is no longer the ﬁrst node
to congest in this new network. Although huge ﬂuctuations occur, as illustrated
in Figure 6.15(a), they are still below the queue buﬀer limit for most of the
simulation period. On the other hand in Figure 6.15(b), queue in Interface(1)
of Router 8 is much more congested and keep reaching the queue’s limit after
simulation time 20. This is the interface connecting to Router 7 which is the
router designed to congested ﬁrst. By looking at the queues on two Router 7’s
interfaces, in Figure 6.16(a) and (b), the queue length jump up to its capacity
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limit at 10 and 12 simulation time way before other routers. This indicates that
Router 7 would be the ﬁrst router to congest or fail to process data packets.
(a)
(b)
Figure 6.11: 9-node catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at low load.
(a) Ethernet Interface(4) Router 1, (b) Ethernet Interface(1) Router 4.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.12: 9-node catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at low load.
(a) Ethernet Interface(1) Router 7, (b) Ethernet Interface(6) Router 7.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.13: 9-node catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at medium
load. (a) Ethernet Interface(2) Router 5, (b) Ethernet Interface(3) Router 1.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.14: 9-node catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at medium
load. (a) Ethernet Interface(1) Router 7, (b) Ethernet Interface(5) Router 7.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.15: 9-node catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at high load.
(a) Ethernet Interface(5) Router 1, (b) Ethernet Interface(1) Router 8.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.16: 9-node catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at high load.
(a) Ethernet Interface(1) Router 7, (b) Ethernet Interface(6) Router 7.
157
6.4 Catastrophic Network Simulation Results
6.4.3 Twelve-node Catastrophic Network Topology
In this subsection we continue to examine the catastrophic network that is one
step larger than the nine-node catastrophic network. At low and medium traf-
ﬁc level, very similar behavior could be found for the queues on routers in the
network, as illustrated in Figure 6.17(a) and (b), Figure 6.18(a) and (b), Fig-
ure 6.19(a) and (b), and Figure 6.20(a) and (b).
But a diﬀerent queue performance is shown at the high traﬃc generation rate
for the UDP applications. The queues on Router 1 and Router 7 are not so long
compared to nine node catastrophic network, shown in Figure 6.21(a) and (b).
Although they grow up to almost 400, it is still within the limit of 1000 packets.
Because more traﬃc is concentrated on Router 10. Router 10 is the new router
in this twelve-node network that is designed to fail ﬁrst. Being the new center of
data ﬂows, queues on it built up quickly and ﬂuctuate up and down between the
boundaries of 1000 and 0 packets. Notice that the pattern of the queue length
ﬂuctuation on Router 10 is diﬀerent from the ones on Router 7 in the nine-node
network. Although the absolute traﬃc data rate remains the same from every
host, it is sent evenly distributed among the 11 remaining hosts. And it reﬂects
diﬀerently on the routers’ queues for diﬀerent topology structures.
By observing the simulations on the twelve, nine and six node catastrophic
networks, we can see the congestion nodes at each network congest ﬁrst at high
traﬃc load. So when router R10 in the twelve node network becomes highly
congested and its links are disconnected, router R11 and R12 will be isolated from
the rest of the network. The topology will then be the nine node catastrophic
network. According to the result from the last subsection, router R7 will then
become highly congested. Then we will remove its links where router R8 and R9
are isolated. Thus, the connected network topology is the seed network – a six
node star-shape network.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.17: 12-node catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at low load.
(a) Ethernet Interface(2) Router 1, (b) Ethernet Interface(3) Router 7.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.18: 12-node catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at low load.
(a) Ethernet Interface(4) Router 10, (b) Ethernet Interface(7) Router 10.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.19: 12-node catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at medium
load. (a) Ethernet Interface(4) Router 1, (b) Ethernet Interface(3) Router 7.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.20: 12-node catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at medium
load. (a) Ethernet Interface(5) Router 10, (b) Ethernet Interface(8) Router 10.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.21: 12-node catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at high
load. (a) Ethernet Interface(3) Router 1, (b) Ethernet Interface(7) Router 7.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.22: 12-node catastrophic network with constant UDP traﬃc at high




By introducing the process and building blocks of simulation, we ﬁrst explain
the network simulation models. Then diﬀerent simulation tools are compared
and we choose to use OMNet++ the open source C++ based network simulation
platform. Afterwards, the network scenarios and simulation setup are explained
in detail. Finally, we analyze the queue status of routers and hosts in three
diﬀerent networks: six-node star-shape network, nine-node catastrophic network
and twelve-node catastrophic network. Although we connect only one host to a
router as the source and destination of data ﬂows, it has four UDP applications
running at the same time simulating the aggregation of traﬃc from LAN hosts.
The routers simulated are also not fully functioned real routers, where many detail
protocols and router features are omitted. For example, there is no Access Control
List conﬁgured on the routers, making their process of routers much faster. But
the traﬃc ﬂow put on the routers are close to the capacity of real routers. From
Cisco System’s router performance and capacity document, small branch router
1800 series and 2600 series have the performance capacity of 35.84Mbps. Medium
branch router 3800 and edge router 7200 could handle up to 256Mbps and 1Gbps.
And only the very expensive ISP carrier routers 10000, 12000, CRS-1 have the
capacity of 10 to 40Gbps. But only small and medium branch routers would be
actually used to run Interior Gateway Protocols (OSPF, EIGRP, and IS-IS). So
the maximum capacity of these routers are similar to the ones simulated with
traﬃc from 2Mbps upto almost 200Mbps.
Last but not least, the simulation proves that the catastrophic network do
fail in the sequence as it is designed. The routers designed to congest ﬁrst do
experience much heavier traﬃc load than other routers. It would be ideal for
us to build a test-bed using physical routers to test the topology. Due to the
limitation of time, funding and other resources, we strongly suggest this as the
future work of this thesis. But the relationship between the queues of the routers,
routers and traﬃc is not so simple. A further detail analysis of the correlations
queues of diﬀerent routers in the network could be a potential topic for further
future study on the catastrophic networks.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Aim of the research
The research in this thesis concentrates on the generation of catastrophic network
topologies concerning both static and dynamic network properties. Examples in
the thesis show that various mission critical networks, for example communica-
tion systems and electricity transmission grids, are susceptible to catastrophic
failures. In many cases, this kind of failure follows an avalanche-like breakdown
of the network’s components or cascade failures. In these networks the traﬃc
and the topology are coupled by the routing mechanisms either using software
or hardware. And all network components have their functioning capacity over
which they will fail to operate properly or fail to operate at all. If a network
component failed due to various reasons, its load would be redistributed by the
routing mechanism. Other components might consequently be overloaded and
fail. This failure can sometimes propagates throughout the entire network, caus-
ing a collapse of the whole critical infrastructure.
From studies of catastrophic failures in diﬀerent technological networks, the
consensus is that the occurrence of a catastrophe is due to the interaction be-
tween the connectivity and the dynamical properties of the network’s elements.
Currently we still cannot predict whether a network will fail catastrophically or
not by simply examining its topology. Although previous studies introduced in
this thesis have shown various way to study cascade behaviour of networks, some
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questions have not been answered: what causes cascade failures; can we replicate
these failures and study their properties?
7.2 Main Results
In our research, we begin with an investigation into the relationship between
network dynamic and structural properties. We ﬁnd out that congestion is related
to the traﬃc and topology properties of the concerning network. The critical
load when the network congests could be predicted based on several topological
properties. The critical load is also an invariant which does not depend on the
network size and topology type.
Betweenness centrality is introduced and used to indicate the importance of
a network node, considering the traﬃc load and using the shortest-path going
through the node. Only analyzing existing networks is not enough to study the
breakdown of critical man-made networks. A simple mechanism for building net-
works that are designed to fail catastrophically has been presented. The network
is built by simulating the cascade in reverse. Starting with a small “seed” net-
works, the catastrophic network is built step by step. At each building step the
network is segmented into three subnetworks. It is to make sure the congestion
node is the ﬁrst to congest in the network at the current step and the congestion
load needs to be larger than that of the previous step. A random search method
has been introduced at each step in search of topology that meets the conditions.
But the random search is not very eﬃcient and eﬀective in ﬁnding the target
catastrophic networks.
To optimize the method to grow catastrophic networks, we then presented
a new method based on the “branch and bound” approach, to speed up the
construction of catastrophic networks. It searches for network topology solutions
systematically and keep the network load close to the original congestion load
of the seed network. To limit the possible topology solution and remove the
unwanted solutions, the upper limit of the size of the subnetworks connecting to
the congestion node is obtained. A lookup table was built including all possible
subnetwork topologies. We also introduced a tree structure to analyse the links
between network from previous step and congestion node. Thus we have precise
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control over the critical load that produces the cascade and the number of steps
the cascade has. Analysis of the catastrophic networks generated also shows that
networks built using random method are close to random networks. But networks
built using branch and bound method have their own properties. The congestion
nodes that are designed to fail at each growing step have diﬀerent degree and
betweenness centrality value from other nodes in the network. The invariant is
also found and indicates that this type of catastrophic networks can be very large
and have a predetermined degree distribution.
To verify if our algorithmic approach to build catastrophic networks can reﬂect
real situations, we evaluate the performance of a small catastrophic network. The
simulation scenarios proved that catastrophic networks do fail in the sequence as
designed. The router designed to congest ﬁrst does experience much heavier
traﬃc load than other routers in the network. Although the simulation has many
limitations, it gives strong evidence that some real-world networks might have
fail in the same way, such as the Gmail server network.
7.3 Conclusion
∙ We have developed a growth algorithm to build catastrophic network topolo-
gies based on theoretical analysis. This family of networks would suﬀer
cascade failures over the critical network load. We have successfully con-
structed catastrophic networks using our proposed methods. Simple catas-
trophic networks have also been simulated using router network scenario
built with OSPF routing protocol. Simulations prove that they do fail ac-
cording our estimation using betweenness centrality for traﬃc load.
∙ The growth algorithm can be used to build catastrophic networks success-
fully. Two methods are proposed: random method and branch and bound
method. From the results, there are at least two kinds of catastrophic
networks. There is a family of catastrophic networks that have a scale
invariant. Hence it is possible to predict the behaviour of large networks
by studying a much smaller network. This also gives the opportunities to
construct a larger size catastrophic networks.
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∙ We still don’t know how to fully characterize the catastrophic networks.
But no previous studies have shown a systematic study of the catastrophic
properties of networks, we believe with the work in this thesis we could do
more to understand these networks better.
7.4 Future Work
∙ Currently the catastrophic networks generated cascade down to the original
seed network, typically a small star-shape network. This is not a normal
cascade failure in real-world networks, where the tendency is for the network
to break down into disconnected subnetworks. To account for this future
research could try to use a number of cores simultaneously in generating
networks.
∙ The Internet Router-level network is not such kind of homogenous network,
but network with diﬀerent types of routers and link capacities and also a
tier structure (brieﬂy discussed in Subsection 4.4.4). A heterogeneous cas-
cading network model could be built to create networks with routers of
diﬀerent service capacities and links with diﬀerent bandwidth. This will
also involve using more complicated routing mechanisms such as weighted
shortest path. For example OSPF uses interface bandwidth parameter as
weight, EIGRP uses the combination of bandwidth, delay and reliability
interface parameters, and BGP uses more policy based complex route cal-
culation methods.
∙ It is beneﬁcial to further investigate that if the catastrophic breakdown of
the Internet or other complex networks are with constant propagating speed
(푎푐푐푒푙푒푟푎푡푖표푛 = 0) or with increasing propagating speed (constant acceler-
ation but positive). For the catastrophic model developed, the propagating
speed is almost constant, because it is designed as a multi-stage cascading
failure with limited nodes in each stage.
∙ The real-world networks’ optimization should be studied to see how we
can change the self-propagation of failures to self-healing. Or is there any
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optimization method could be carried out so that a cascading failure can
be prevented? Then we can produce guideline for network building.
∙ In most of the cases, catastrophic failures are unwanted and eﬀorts are
made to prevent their occurrence. However, there are circumstances in
which this property is desirable. In vehicle and shop windows, for example,
tempered glass is used, partly because it is stronger, but also because it
has the property of shattering into much safer small pieces when broken.
In cases like this catastrophic failures might be seen as being engineered
into the material. A cascade of disconnection of some subnetwork could
then prevent virus from spreading out to the whole network or prevent an
intruder from hacking the whole network system. We can sometimes make
use of the catastrophic properties of networks.
∙ The simulations of catastrophic networks suggested that under very high
packet generation rate traﬃc on the routers would experience signiﬁcant
ﬂuctuation. As we use betweenness centrality to approximation the traﬃc
load of a router, it only considers the average traﬃc. We could further
improve the estimation model by also considering the traﬃc ﬂuctuations.
∙ To predict the catastrophic failure, we can try to understand the correla-
tion between diﬀerent network traﬃc ﬂows. One can always use real-time
data from network analysis softwares, i.e. Cisco Netﬂow and NetScout net-
work probes. It is quite useful if network congestion and failures could
be investigated through a dynamical way where we can sent out real time
alarms. From previous research, traﬃc ﬂow cross-correlations are calcu-
lated to examine the relationship between diﬀerent ﬂows from node to node
[129; 130; 131]. The correlation shows that most of the traﬃc ﬂows are re-
lated to each other through the queues in the network. A network of queues
model are studied but yet to ﬁnd out the solution to predict and analyse






A.1 Catastrophic Network Topology
In Chapter 4 we proposed a random growth method to generate catastrophic
networks using a small seed network. In this section we are going to show more
results of the random growth method using other seed networks rather than star-
shape networks. It is to check if the change of seed network would aﬀect the
catastrophic network generated. For example, would the network built has a
larger size or not. Four diﬀerent seed networks introduced in Chapter 4 are used:
two-stars shape network, three-stars shape network, chain shape network and
random network.
From Figure A.1, the catastrophic networks grown with two-stars shape seed
could reach the size of 45 nodes. They are not large size networks and the degree
distributions are similar to those of random networks. The resulting catastrophic
networks grown from three-stars seed network could be as large as 110 nodes,
Figure A.2. It might be due to the larger size and more complex connectivities
of the seed network that make it easier to grow catastrophic networks. But
their maximum betweenness centrality of nodes in the network do not follow the
upper boundaries closely. With a chain shape seed network, the catastrophic
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networks can be even larger with 150 nodes as can be seen in Figure A.3. The
degree distributions show us that there are two types of nodes in the network:
nodes with degree 4 to 5 and nodes with degree 10 to 11. We believe that
the nodes with higher degrees are the congestion nodes while the nodes with
lower degrees are nodes added in each growing steps. Finally, we can see from
Figure A.4, networks grow from the random seed network have their congestion
node betweenness centralities approaching the lower boundary very quickly. This
means the growth run out of possible solutions and have to increase the traﬃc
generation rate a lot to match the conditions.
Regarding the results from using diﬀerent seed networks, no matter how we
could build the catastrophic network larger or smaller, there is one thing in com-
mon. The betweenness centralities deviate from the upper boundary following
the growth of the network. This is why we try to introduce a better method in
Chapter 5, the branch and bound method.
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Figure A.1: Catastrophic Networks Built using Two-stars Shape Seed Network
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Figure A.2: Catastrophic Networks Built using Three-stars Shape Seed Network
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Figure A.3: Catastrophic Networks Built using Chain Shape Seed Network
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Figure A.4: Catastrophic Networks Built using Random Seed Network
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A.2 OMNET++ Simulation Setup
This section includes the OMNET++ Simulation scenario setup using INET
framework. Here we show the setup of the six-node star-shape network. Firstly
the host IP conﬁguration is shown with Class C private address, where it uses a
default route to get to the directly connected router. Router IP conﬁguration is
more complicated involving the setup of each router interfaces. The router has an
Ethernet interface with the Local Area Network (LAN) where the host belongs
to. Router also has point-to-point connections to other routers using Ethernet in-
terfaces. The OSPF routing information update Link State Advertisement (LSA)
multicast address is also setup on the router point-to-point interfaces.
The network conﬁguration example is introduced. It ﬁrst loads the host and
router conﬁguration ﬁles. Then the application running on each host is set as the
UDP basic application. We create four instance of the UDP basic applications
with UDP local and destination port number, message length and message fre-
quency. Finally the ARP (address resolution protocol) time out is set as 1 second
by default.
In the ﬁnal subsection, the OSPF conﬁguration is introduced. It is similar
to the real router OSPF process setup but we just need one ﬁle for the whole
network. In that, it includes the OSPF area statement 1 and network declaration
in it. It also contains he OSPF conﬁguration for each router in the network which
is vital for OSPF router neighbor discovery, shortest path calculation and rout-
ing information update. For example, Area ID, Interface Cost, Retransmission
Interval, Hello Interval, Router Dead Interval, Authentication Type and key.
A.2.1 Host IP Conﬁguration Example
ifconﬁg:




1We just use a single area, area 0 in the simulation scenario.
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default: * 0.0.0.0 H 0 eth0
routeend.
A.2.2 Router IP Conﬁguration Example
ifconﬁg:
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route:
224.0.0.0 * 240.0.0.0 H 0 eth0
224.0.0.0 * 240.0.0.0 H 0 eth1
224.0.0.0 * 240.0.0.0 H 0 eth2
224.0.0.0 * 240.0.0.0 H 0 eth3
224.0.0.0 * 240.0.0.0 H 0 eth4
224.0.0.0 * 240.0.0.0 H 0 eth5
routeend.
A.2.3 Network Conﬁguration Example
OSPFv2 test network.
General
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**.udpApp[0].localPort = 1234
**.udpApp[0].destPort = 1234












**.udpApp[3].messageLength = 1024 bytes
**.udpApp[3].messageFreq = 0.1s
**.H1.udpApp[0].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H2.udpApp[0].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H3.udpApp[0].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H4.udpApp[0].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H5.udpApp[0].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2
192.168.4.2”
**.H6.udpApp[0].destAddresses=”192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
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**.H1.udpApp[1].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H2.udpApp[1].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H3.udpApp[1].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H4.udpApp[1].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H5.udpApp[1].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2
192.168.4.2”
**.H6.udpApp[1].destAddresses=”192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H1.udpApp[2].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H2.udpApp[2].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H3.udpApp[2].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H4.udpApp[2].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H5.udpApp[2].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2
192.168.4.2”
**.H6.udpApp[2].destAddresses=”192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H1.udpApp[3].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H2.udpApp[3].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H3.udpApp[3].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
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**.H4.udpApp[3].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2
192.168.5.2”
**.H5.udpApp[3].destAddresses=”192.168.6.2 192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2
192.168.4.2”
**.H6.udpApp[3].destAddresses=”192.168.1.2 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.2 192.168.4.2
192.168.5.2”
**.arp.cacheTimeout = 1s
































































































































































































































































































































activenode = V = (int)adjmatrix.size();}
void InitialBC(int v,vector<vector<int>> adj){
adjmatrix.clear();
adjmatrix = adj;





















A.3 Source Code of Random Growing and Branch & Bound Method
while(!Q.empty()){


































A.3 Source Code of Random Growing and Branch & Bound Method
max = 0;
maxnode = 0;
for( int i = 0;i<V;i++){






{ cerr<<"Error Opening File!\n";
exit(0);//then exit}
fout<<"Betweenness Centrality: ";
for(unsigned int i = 0;i<Cb.size();i++){
fout<<endl<<" Node "<<i<<" "<<Cb[i];}}
int Getmax(){return max;}
int Getmaxnode(){return maxnode;}







bool bigger( nodew& n1, nodew& n2){
return( (n1.w<n2.w) && (n1.num<n2.num) );}



































int u = Q.top()->Nw();
int uw = Q.top()->W();




















cout<< *i<<" "; }






for(int i = 0;i<activenode;i++){
if(d[i]==1000){







{ vector <vector<int>> p;
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for (int i = 0; i < V; i++){
p[i].assign(V, -1); d[i].assign(V, 65535); }
for (int s = 0; s < V; s++){
d[s][s] = 0;
for(int t = 0; t < V; t++){
if (adjmatrix[s][t]!=0){
p[s][t] =t;
d[s][t] = adjmatrix[s][t]; }
}}}




for (int i = 0; i < V; i++){
p[i].assign(V, -1); d[i].assign(V, 65535); }
for (int s = 0; s < V; s++){
d[s][s] = 0;
for (int t = 0; t < V; t++){
if (adjmatrix[s][t]!=0){
p[s][t] =t; //G.edge(s, t);
d[s][t] = adjmatrix[s][t]; }}
}}
void search(){
for (int i = 0; i < V; i++){
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for (int s = 0; s < V; s++){
if (p[s][i]!=-1){
for (int t = 0; t < V; t++){
if (s != t){
if (d[s][t] > d[s][i] + d[i][t]){
p[s][t] = p[s][i];








double sum = 0.0;
int i, j;
for(i = 0; i<activenode; i++){
for(j= 0;j<activenode;j++){
sum += d[i][j];}}
double ellbar = sum/(activenode*(activenode-1));
return ellbar;}
int path(int s, int t) const
{ return p[s][t]; }
int dist(int s, int t) const







vector <vector <int> > adj;
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Network(int V, bool digraph);
˜Network( );
void Initial(int V, bool digraph1);
int V() const { return Vcnt; }
int Activenode() const {return ActiveNode;}
int E() const { return Ecnt; }
bool directed() const {return digraph; }
void insert(int s, int d);
void insert(int s, int d,int w);
bool deletelink(int s, int d);
void deletel(int s, int d);
void addNode( );
bool deleteNode(int n);
int edge(int v, int w) const { return adj[v][w]; }
void writefrom(vector<vector<int>> newadj,





int getNoNodes(){ return (int) nodes.size();}
vector<vector<int>> getAdj(){ return adj; }























Network::Network(int V, bool digraph = false):
adj(V),nodes(V),Vcnt(V),Ecnt(0),ActiveNode(0),digraph(digraph){
disconnected = false;
for (int i = 0; i < V; i++){
adj[i].assign(V, 0);
nodes.assign(V,0);}
cout<<endl<<"Simulation Network Object Created"<<endl;
}
Network::˜Network(){}
void Network::Initial(int V, bool digraph1 ){
adj.assign(V,vector<int> (V,0));
nodes.assign(V,0);
Vcnt = V; Ecnt = 0;
ActiveNode = 0;
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digraph = digraph1;
disconnected = false;
if(bc1!=NULL){bc1 = new BC(ActiveNode,adj);}
if(floyd1!=NULL){floyd1 = new myFloyd(V,ActiveNode,adj);}
cout<<endl<<"Simulation Network Initialized"<<endl;}
void Network::insert(int s,int d){
int v = s, w = d;
if (adj[v][w] == 0) Ecnt++;
if (!digraph){adj[w][v] =adj[v][w] =1;}
else{adj[v][w] =1; }}
void Network::insert(int s,int d,int w){
int v = s, x = d;
if (adj[v][x] == 0) Ecnt++;
if (!digraph){adj[x][v] =adj[v][x] =w;}
else{adj[v][x] =w;}}
bool Network::deletelink(int s, int d)
{ if(dijkstra1!=NULL){







if (adj[s][d] != 0) Ecnt--;
adj[s][d] = 0;
if (!digraph) adj[d][s] = 0;
return true;}}
void Network::deletel(int s,int d){
if (adj[s][d] != 0){
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nodes.erase(remove(nodes.begin(), nodes.end(), n), nodes.end());
cout<<endl<<"renumbering: "<<endl;
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fout<<"********* the graph adjacent list***"<<endl;











char inputfile[] = "star6.dat";
inFile.open(inputfile,ios::in);
if (!inFile) {
cerr<<"Can’t open input file "<<inputfile<<endl;
exit(1);}
int num1,num2,weight;
int min = 0; int max = 0;
while (!inFile.eof()) {
inFile >> num1 >> num2>> weight;
if(num1<min||num2<min){
cerr<<endl<<"The numbers in the link list are less than zero!"<<endl;
exit(1);}
203










char inputfile[] = "star6.dat";
inputlink.open(inputfile,ios::in);
if (!inputlink) {















































#define MATRIX_A 0x9908b0dfUL /* constant vector a */
#define UPPER_MASK 0x80000000UL /* most significant w-r bits */






A.3 Source Code of Random Growing and Branch & Bound Method
/* initializes mt[N] with a seed */
void init_genrand(unsigned long s);
/* initialize by an array with array-length */
/* init_key is the array for initializing keys */
/* key_length is its length */
void init_by_array(unsigned long init_key[], int key_length);
/* generates a random number on [0,0x7fffffff]-interval */
long genrand_int31(void);
/* generates a random number on [0,1]-real-interval */
double genrand_real1(void);
/* generates a random number on [0,1)-real-interval */
double genrand_real2(void);
/* generates a random number on (0,1)-real-interval */
double genrand_real3(void);
/* generates a random number on [0,1) with 53-bit resolution*/
double genrand_res53(void);
private:
/* the array for the state vector */
static unsigned long mt[N];
/* mti==N+1 means mt[N] is not initialized */
static int mti;

















/* initializes mt[N] with a seed */
void RandomNumber::init_genrand(unsigned long s){
mt[0]= s & 0xffffffffUL;




void RandomNumber::init_by_array(unsigned long init_key[],int key_length){




for (; k; k--) {
mt[i] = (mt[i]ˆ((mt[i-1]ˆ(mt[i-1]>>30))*1664525UL))
+ init_key[j] + j; /* non linear */
mt[i] &= 0xffffffffUL; /* for WORDSIZE > 32 machines */
i++; j++;
if(i>=N){ mt[0] = mt[N-1]; i=1; }
if(j>=key_length) j=0;
}
for (k=N-1; k; k--) {
mt[i] = (mt[i]ˆ((mt[i-1]ˆ(mt[i-1]>>30))*1566083941UL))-i;
mt[i] &= 0xffffffffUL; /* for WORDSIZE > 32 machines */
i++;
if(i>=N){ mt[0] = mt[N-1]; i=1; }
}
mt[0] = 0x80000000UL; /*MSB is 1; assuring non-zero initial array*/
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}
/* generates a random number on [0,0xffffffff]-interval */
unsigned long RandomNumber::genrand_int32(void){
unsigned long y;
static unsigned long mag01[2]={0x0UL, MATRIX_A};
/* mag01[x] = x*MATRIX_A for x=0,1 */
if (mti >= N) { /* generate N words at one time */
int kk;
if (mti == N+1)/*if init_genrand() has not been called,*/















y ˆ= (y >> 11);
y ˆ= (y << 7) & 0x9d2c5680UL;
y ˆ= (y << 15) & 0xefc60000UL;
y ˆ= (y >> 18);
return y;
}
/* generates a random number on [0,0x7fffffff]-interval */
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long RandomNumber::genrand_int31(void){
return (long)(genrand_int32()>>1);}
/* generates a random number on [0,1]-real-interval */
double RandomNumber::genrand_real1(void){
return genrand_int32()*(1.0/4294967295.0);
/* divided by 2ˆ32-1 */}
/* generates a random number on [0,1)-real-interval */
double RandomNumber::genrand_real2(void){
return genrand_int32()*(1.0/4294967296.0);
/* divided by 2ˆ32 */}
/* generates a random number on (0,1)-real-interval */
double RandomNumber::genrand_real3(void){
return(((double)genrand_int32())+0.5)*(1.0/4294967296.0);
/* divided by 2ˆ32 */}
/* generates a random number on [0,1) with 53-bit resolution*/
double RandomNumber::genrand_res53(void){






































vector <vector <int> > Duadj;
vector<int> Dunodes;










































































A.3 Source Code of Random Growing and Branch & Bound Method
Na = dg.Activenode();




























"It is the maximum for full connection of A-F, but no solution yet"
<<endl;}




A.3 Source Code of Random Growing and Branch & Bound Method
while(!visitbit.empty() && stepflag==false){
int ccbit = (int)rand1.genrand_real3()*(int)visitbit.size();
visitbit.erase(visitbit.begin()+ccbit);
if(stepflag==true){
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ReadfromDu();
int subnet = 0; int transit = 0; int j=0;
bool flag2; bool flag=false;
while(conB[subnet]<=maxNB && subnet<(int)conB.size() && stepflag!=true){
j=conB[subnet];
















if(bestload[currentstep] - Targetload < 0.001 ){
if(currentstep!=0){
if( bestload[currentstep]>=bestload[currentstep-1]){
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cout<<endl<<"already have the best load";
return;}
else{












int cbit = currentbit; int zbit;
if( cbit<((int)connection.size()-1) ){
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cout<<endl<<"already have the best load";
return;}
else{
int cbit = currentbit;





else{cout<<endl<<"this bit is already zero???"<<endl;}
if(cbit<(int)connection.size()&& zbit<(int)connection.size()){
if(isCbmax()){






























dg.addNode();//place 2 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);




dg.addNode();//place 2 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center,center+2);
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dg.addNode();//place 3 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center,center+2);







dg.addNode();//place 3 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center,center+2);




dg.addNode();//place 3 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center,center+2);




dg.addNode();//place 3 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center,center+2);
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dg.addNode();//place the third node in B
dg.insert(center+1,center+3);}
if(randpick>0.75){
dg.addNode();//place 3 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center,center+2);







dg.addNode();//place 3 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center,center+2);





dg.addNode();//place 3 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center,center+2);
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if(randpick>0 && randpick<=0.2){
dg.addNode();//place 3 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center,center+2);






dg.addNode();//place 3 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center,center+2);




dg.addNode();//place 3 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center,center+2);




dg.addNode();//place 3 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center,center+2);
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dg.insert(center+2,center+3);}
if(randpick>0.8){
dg.addNode();//place 3 nodes in B
dg.insert(center,center+1);
dg.addNode();//place the other node in B
dg.insert(center+1,center+2);


























































unsigned tim,run_time_hrs, run_time_mins, run_time_secs;
tim=clock()/CLOCKS_PER_SEC;
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cout<<endl<<"The program has been running for: "<<run_time_hrs












Number Generation and Graph
Visualization
B.1 Catastrophic Network Topology Generator
Based on the methods proposed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we implement
them using ANSI C and C++ standard programming language. The codes are
compiled using GCC (GNU Compiler Collection) [132] and ICC (Intel C++ Com-
pliler) [133]. The source code is not available in this thesis due to intellectual
property restrictions. The hardware platform used is a four node cluster built
with Viglen 1U server with two Intel Duo Core Xeron 5500 serial CPU and 6
Gigabyte DDR memory. The catastrophic topology generator not only include
the code to generate the catastrophic networks introduced but also other basic
topologies. For example, ER random network topology, Scale-free network topol-
ogy, regular network topology. All these kinds of networks could be generated
and used to compare with catastrophic networks. We also include shortest path
calculation algorithms: Bellman-Ford, Dijkstra’s, and Floyd’s. They will be in-
troduced in detail in the following section. Finally, the betweenness centrality
calculation is implemented using Brandes’ method [57]. It is vital component for
the generation of catastrophic networks.
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B.2 Graph Related Libraries
By considering the commercial and open-source simulators available and the re-
cent research in network simulation [134] and the available graph libraries, C++
(or C) is a preferred programming language. It is decided to use the C++ (Object
Oriented Language) as the programming language including its STL (Standard
Template Library) with other graph libraries available.
B.2.0.1 BGL
Graphs are mathematical abstractions that are useful for solving many types
of problems in computer science. Consequently, these abstractions must also be
represented in computer programs. A standardized generic interface for traversing
graphs is of utmost importance to encourage reuse of graph algorithms and data
structures. Part of the Boost Graph Library(BGL) [84] is a generic interface that
allows access to a graph’s structure, but hides the details of the implementation.
This is an “open” interface in the sense that any graph library that implements
this interface will be interoperable with the BGL generic algorithms and with
other algorithms that also use this interface. The BGL provides some general
purpose graph classes that conform to this interface, but they are not meant to
be the “only” graph classes; there certainly will be other graph classes that are
better for certain situations. The main contribution of the BGL is the formulation
of the interface.
The BGL algorithms consist of a core set of algorithm patterns (implemented
as generic algorithms) and a larger set of graph algorithms. The core algorithm
patterns are: Breadth First Search, Depth First Search, Uniform Cost Search.
By themselves, the algorithm patterns do not compute any meaningful quantities
over graphs; they are merely building blocks for constructing graph algorithms.
The graph algorithms in the BGL currently include:
∙ Dijkstra’s Shortest Paths
∙ Bellman-Ford Shortest Paths
∙ Johnson’s All-Pairs Shortest Paths
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∙ Kruskal’s Minimum Spanning Tree
∙ Prim’s Minimum Spanning Tree
∙ Connected Components
∙ Strongly Connected Components
∙ Dynamic Connected Components (using Disjoint Sets)
∙ Topological Sort
B.2.0.2 Graph Algorithms
The “Algorithms in C++, Graph Algorithms” is a whole set of graph related
algorithms analogized and written by Robert Sedgewick [86]. His work was on
describing the most important known methods for solving the graph-processing
problems that arise in practice.
B.2.0.3 iGraph
It is another library for creating and manipulating graphs. The authors developed
this library aiming to handle very large size graphs confronted more eﬃciently.
Igraph started as an additional package to the GNU R statistical environment,
and still some functions available only in R language. Like all other graph li-
braries, it provides a set of graph related algorithms: functions for generating
regular and random graphs according to known algorithms and models in the
network theory literature; routines for manipulating graphs, adding and remov-
ing edges and vertices; a set of structural property calculation functions like
degree, betweenness; force based layout generators; simple and eﬃcient way of
walking through graphs.
B.3 Random Number Generation
Most of the simulations of complex networks which have random components
in them, require a reliable method of generating or obtaining numbers that are
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random in some sense. For example, when generating a random graph using the
ER-model [61; 62], or when simulating the M/M/1 queue [25; 135]. Further,
the speciﬁc distribution may also required which could be generated from the
pseudo or quasi random variables. Most of the random variables are generated
from the uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]. This distribution was de-
noted by 푈(0, 1). Although it is the simplest continuous distribution of all, it is
extremely important that it able to obtain such independent random numbers.
The important role of the 푈(0, 1) distribution stems from the face that random
variables from all other distributions (normal, binomial,exponential, etc.) and re-
alization of various random processes (e.g., Poisson Process) can be obtained by
transforming 푈(0, 1) in a way determined by the desired distribution or process.
The main purpose of this section is not to analysis the random number gener-
ation in detail. While it is to show the mostly used and trusted random number
generators which are also used in this thesis. Because the catastrophic network
topology generation code and the simulation codes are mainly written in C/C++,
several C++ library are used so that the codes are more reliable and eﬃcient. The
distribution ”rand” function in the C/C++ library is a pseudo-random number
generation function but not good enough for scientiﬁc research. The introduction
of Intel Math Kernel Library [8] to the coding has provide a set of sophisticated
random number generators and distribution generator.
The speciﬁc random number generation algorithm used in this thesis is the
Mersenne-Tweister random number generation method. It is a pseudo random
number generator developed in 1997 by Makoto Matsumoto and Takuji Nishimura
[136]. It is one of the most commonly used and reliable random number generation
algorithm. The version included in the Intel Math Kernel Library is the Mersenne-
Twister MT19937 with 32-bit word length.
B.4 Analysis of Modern Topology Generators
B.4.1 Topology Generation
For generation a range of network topologies, from the regular-symmetric network
to diﬀerent Scale-free network, the general “topology” generation model is built
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Basic Random-Number Generators (BRNGs)
Pseudo-random
MCG59: Multiplicative Congruential Generator 59-bit
MCG31m1: Multiplicative Congruential Generator 31-bit
MRG32k3a: Multiple Recursive Generator 32-bit
R250: Generalized feedback shift register
Wichman-Hill: A set of 273 basic generators
MT19937: Mersenne Twister
MT2203: A set of 1024 Mersenne Twister basic generators
Quasi-random
Sobol: A 32-bit Gray code-based generator
Niederreiter: A 32-bit Gray code-based generator
Table B.1: The table generated from Intel Math Kernel Library Manual. Detail
of diﬀerent random number generation methods can be found in the [8], [9], and
reference there in.
using a few parameters and output the needed network topology. The input
parameters of the topology generator is shown in Table. The output is printed
Parameter Name Description
N Total number of nodes in the network
Type of network 1,Regular Symmetric; 2,Pure Random;
3,Scale-free; 4, Tier Random
k degree distribution for random network
w Weighted graph with random weight(latency)
r Router density
Table B.2: Topology Generation Input Parameter
on a ﬁle which would contain the topology information. It would be in the form
of showing the source node, destination node of a link, and the weight of the link
if it is a weighted graph.
B.4.2 Waxman
The Waxman model been widely used to generate random topologies for network
simulations. It starts by placing n nodes uniformly on an 푛 by 푛 plane. Once
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all nodes have been placed on the plane, the model computes the probability




where 푑(푢, 푣) is the Euclidean distance between 푢 and 푣, 훼 is the average out-
degree, 퐿 the maximum distance between any two nodes, and 훽 determines the
average edge length. Then a random number is generated between 0 and 1.
An edge is created between 푢 and 푣 only if the random number is smaller than
푃 (푢, 푣).It is the basic and reference model for many other random topology gen-
erators.
B.4.3 Inet
The Inet3.0 topology generator [137] is an Autonomous System (AS) level In-
ternet topology generator. It is important to note that Inet only provides the
connectivity information; the generated topologies do not have any information
pertaining to latency, bandwidth etc. The parameters provided for the code to
generate a AS-level topology includes: N,the total number of nodes; k,the fraction
of degree-one nodes; n,the size of the plane used for node placement; sd,the seed
to initialize the random number generator. It is a tool to generate the Internet
like AS-level topology, but it is a little bit out-of-date and not considering some
important properties in the Internet (clustering).
B.4.4 GT-ITM
Georgia Tech Internetwork Topology [137], generates topologies based on several
diﬀerent models. But the transit-stub model attracts much attentions in that
it closely resembles the Internet topology. Similar to Tier model following, the
transit-stub model has a well-deﬁned hierarchical structure. It generates topolo-
gies with two levels of hierarchy: one consisting of transit ASs, and the other
consisting of stub ASs. To generate a topology, GT-ITM ﬁrst generates a con-
nected random graph of 푇 nodes; each node represents a transit AS. Each transit
AS is then instantiated as, and replaced by, a connected random graph with an
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average of 푁푡 number of nodes. Next, each node in the transit AS are connected
to, on the average, 퐾 number of stub ASs. Each stub AS consists of a connected
graph with an average of 푁푠 number of nodes. The connectivity used to generate
each connected graph can be selected from one of the six methods: PureRandom,
Waxman1, Waxman2, Doar-Leslie, Exponential, or Locality. But the deﬁciency
is it do not bring in the Scale-free network, which newly discovered model for the
complex network topology.
B.4.5 Tiers Network Topology
The Tiers generator [125] is based on a three level hierarchy that represents
WAN, MAN, and LAN. To generate a random topology using Tiers, one speciﬁes
a target number of LANs and MANs. Currently Tiers cannot generate more
than one WAN per random topology. For each level of hierarchy, one also has to
specify a ﬁxed number of nodes per network. For all these constraints, it is not
easy to examine its properties and model the Internet. But still it is an good idea
to based on while modeling the real-world Internet.
B.4.6 BRITE
BRITE [138] is another generator based on the power-law degree distribution
which is used by the NS2 and OMNeT++ network simulator. Furthermore,
BRITE also incorporates recent ﬁndings on the origin of power-laws and obser-
vations of skewed network placement and locality in network connections on the
Internet. BRITE supports multiple generation models including models for ﬂat
AS, ﬂat Router and hierarchical topologies. Models can be enhanced by assigning
links attributes such as bandwidth and delay. The BRITE can be considered as
the a sophisticated generation package.
B.5 Network Visualization
Graph visualization is a way of representing structural information as diagrams
of abstract graphs and networks. Especially, when simulating the congestion and
network failure, the graph’s evolving and breaking down are much easier to be
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shown in a visual way. For example, a cut oﬀ of a link, a break-down of a node
and it’s attached links. Automatic graph drawing has an important application
in networking design and graph analysis.
B.5.1 Positioning Algorithm
The most important parameter for graph (network) visualization is the position
of the vertices (nodes). It is the diﬀerence in the positioning pattern that shows
the reader the speciﬁc network properties in a more eye-friendly way where the
pattern of the network could be easily seen.
The most commonly used algorithm for graph positioning is the spring em-
bedding algorithms also called FDP (Force Directed Placement). It can be used
to sort randomly placed nodes into a desirable layout hat satisﬁes the aesthetics
for visual presentation (symmetry, non-overlapping etc.) FDP [139] views nodes
as physical bodies and edges as springs connected to the nodes providing forces
between them. Nodes move according to the forces on them until a local energy
minimum is achieved. Based on this serveral commonly used algorithm is avail-
able in most of the graph related programming libraries and some forming their
own libraries.
∙ The Kamada-Kawai Algorithm [140]
∙ The Fruchterman-Reingold Algorithm [141]
∙ The k-core decomposition [72], which is used to visualize large scale complex
networks in two dimensions.
B.5.2 Graph Visualization Tools
For most of the available algorithms, one do not have to code to get them work.
Instead, there are a few very good existing graph visualization tools available
either as a software application or as a library.
∙ Pajek is a program, for Windows, for analysis and visualization of large
networks having some thousands or even millions of vertices. With Pajek
one can: ﬁnd clusters (components, neighborhoods of important vertices,
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cores, etc.) in a network, extract vertices that belong to the same clusters
and show them separately, possibly with the parts of the context (detailed
local view), shrink vertices in clusters and show relations among clusters
(global view) [4].
∙ Processing is an open source programming language and environment for
people who want to program images, animation, and interactions. It is
a very good visualization software package where one an explore diﬀerent
positioning algorithms by embedded them into the processing codes.
∙ Graphviz is open source graph visualization software. It has several main
graph layout programs. It also has web and interactive graphical interfaces,
and auxiliary tools, libraries, and language bindings.
∙ LaNet-vi provides images of large scale networks on a two-dimensional
layout. The algorithm is based on the k-core decomposition.
B.5.3 Visualization Summary
Visualization is the best way of revealing the structural property of an network.
By positioning the nodes and links in diﬀerent patterns, one can easily tell the
hidden nature of the networks. All of the graphs produced throughout this report
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